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Abstract 
 
By the late 1980s Korea’s interventionist and export oriented development model had 
contributed to a number of serious structural weaknesses in the economy. Ongoing 
government involvement in the banking and corporate sectors, weak prudential supervision 
of financial institutions, and restricted financial market and corporate competition created 
moral hazard, as banks and corporates believed they would not be held accountable for their 
actions due to their close relationship with government. This resulted in financial sector risk 
mismanagement and highly leveraged growth of the chaebols. After 1988, when the new 
democratically elected civilian administration removed long-standing restrictions on union 
activity, rapid wage growth, in excess of productivity gains, eroded profitability. These 
structural weaknesses, and policy errors and mismanagement, made Korea increasingly 
vulnerable to external shocks during the 1990s. In mid-1995, a rapid depreciation of the 
Japanese yen and a world semi-conductor glut and price fall provided the trigger for a rapid 
slowdown in exports and industrial output, and an unprecedented wave of chaebol 
bankruptcies that undermined the solvency of financial institutions. Korea’s long period of 
sustained economic growth, low inflation, strong investment and balanced budgets had 
lulled policy makers into complacency. They failed to act decisively to tackle the growing 
structural weaknesses. Korea’s high exposure to short term foreign debt and loss of foreign 
exchange reserves through a vain and unsustainable attempt to defend the won further 
undermined foreign investor and creditor confidence. 
 
This paper discusses in some detail these developments and their contribution to the 
financial and economic crisis experienced by the country during 1997-98. It also identifies 
key lessons for countries contemplating similar rapid development, and key warning signs 
that need to be heeded to avoid similar happenings to that which occurred in Korea. 
 1 
1. Introduction 
 
Few countries in history have attained such a high level of development so rapidly as 
Korea. In a single generation this poor nation, consisting primarily of subsistence farmers in 
the 1950s and early 1960s, had been transformed into the world’s largest producer of home 
appliances, the second largest producer of semi-conductor chips, the second largest ship 
builder, the fifth largest car maker, the 11th largest economy in the World and the third 
largest in Asia, and the 12th largest exporter and trading nation by 1996 (Harvie and Lee 
(2003a)). Koreans became accustomed to rapid economic growth and development and low 
unemployment driven by very high rates of saving and investment and a strong emphasis on 
education, which boosted the share of youth enrolled in universities to amongst the highest 
levels in the OECD1 area. Since the early 1960s per capita income doubled every eight years 
rising from US$80 to US$10,000 by 1996 (Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade  (1999)), equalling 50 per cent of Australian per capita GDP and 35 per cent of US 
per capita GDP. Income remained relatively equally distributed. Living standards for 
ordinary Koreans increased dramatically with life expectancy increasing from 47 in 1955 to 
72 years2; and with its 98 per cent adult literacy rate and 83 per cent gross educational 
enrolment ratio it could match industrial country standards. The country’s attainment of 
OECD membership in December 1996 3 , the Paris based club of the world’s richest 
industrialised nations, signified the culmination of 35 years of extraordinary growth and the 
economy’s coming of age. Its model of economic development, state directed capitalism, 
became the envy of other developing economies wishing to replicate such rapid 
development. Yet, less than a year after its accession to the OECD, the country experienced 
a traumatic and severe financial crisis. 
 
Despite these remarkable achievements, structural weaknesses and an inability of the 
country’s political and economic organisations to keep pace with the country’s material 
achievements began to undermine the economy. The structural and inherent weaknesses of 
the state-led industrialisation strategy became especially evident by the late 1980s and early 
1990s as the country entered into the stage of a middle-income country (see Harvie and Lee 
(2003a)), and hence its markets became bigger and more complicated such that a handful of 
elite government officials were no longer able to manipulate the entire economy. Reform 
and liberalisation was urgently required in a number of key areas: the industrial sector; 
financial markets and the banking sector; the labour market; the small and medium sized 
enterprise sector; and in trade and investment. At the core of these problems was the close 
relationship between the government, banks and the chaebol, which created moral hazard as 
the banks and corporations believed they would not be held accountable for their actions 
(Joh (1999) and Chang, Park and Yoo (1998))). In particular, the state guided banks’ habit 
of lending on the basis of political whim rather than proper risk assessment resulted in a 
severe mis-allocation of resources, and a substantial accumulation by the banks of non-
performing loans (Borzenstein and Lee (1999)). Government backed industrial policy 
resulted in an overly close relationship between the government and the business 
conglomerates, which resulted in corruption, a sapping of entrepreneurial creativity and 
                                                           
1 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. 
2 The OECD average was 76 years. 
3 An officially stated objective of the government since 1993. 
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growth, and an unwillingness to open up the economy to foreign trade and investment, 
despite intense pressure from its trading partners, due to the chaebols wishing to protect 
their own interests and dominance over domestic markets4 (Smith (1998)). Also, after 1988, 
when the new democratically elected civilian administration removed long standing 
restrictions on union activity, rapid wage rises, in excess of productivity, contributed to an 
erosion of profitability. This was compounded by unhealthy industrial relations 
characterized by hostile confrontation and union militancy (Australian Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade  (1999)). 
This system led to excessive and ill utilised loans to the chaebol, with little concern for 
adequacy of return and risk, and resulted in: over-capacity in many sectors of the economy; 
dangerously over-leveraged chaebol; a crowding out of small firms; less innovation and 
flexibility in the economy; and the accumulation of non-performing loans by the banking 
system (Harvie and Lee (2003a)). This was exacerbated by capital market opening from 
1993 that led to a rapid increase in capital inflows, over-borrowing, particularly in the form 
of short-term debt, and an appreciation of the domestic currency (Australian Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade  (1999)). During 1997 the country’s financial fragility was 
exposed and problems multiplied considerably, and the unsustainability of this situation 
became only too apparent. An unprecedented eight conglomerates were declared insolvent 
or sought protection from their creditors, leading to increasing bad debts for the banking 
system which then tightened credit and caused more corporate difficulties and failures. The 
situation was exacerbated by the dramatic slide of the won, the domestic currency, against 
the US dollar towards the end of October 1997, as the domestic demand for US dollars 
increased and confidence in the domestic currency waned. The banking and corporate 
sectors' need to service foreign loans primarily denominated in US dollars in exchange for 
domestic currency, as well as currency dealers questioning the ability of the country to pay 
back its US$153 billion in foreign loans of which two-thirds was shortly maturing debt, put 
downward pressure on the currency. By the end of 1997 it was clear that major restructuring 
of the economy had to take place, focusing upon that of the financial, industrial, labour 
market and external sectors. The old model of economic development appeared to have run 
its course (Harvie and Lee (2003a)). The build up to this crisis during the crucial period of 
the 1990s provides the focus of this study. 
 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 conducts a brief overview of 
Korea’s macroeconomic performance during the period of the 1990s. International trade, 
investment, debt and exchange rate developments are discussed in more detail in section 3. 
Developing structural weaknesses in the economy are investigated in section 4. Section 5 
reviews other deficiencies in the economy during this period. Policy weaknesses are 
discussed in section 6. Section 7 identifies the key lessons from the experience of the 
Korean economy during the period of the 1990s. Finally, section 8 presents a summary of 
the major conclusions from this paper.   
 
2. Korea’s macroeconomic performance during the 1990s 
 
                                                           
4 Efforts had been made by the government from the early 1980s to reduce the dominance of the chaebol 
within the economy, but without success. 
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From the mid 1960s to the late 1990s the Korean economy was one of the fastest growing 
in Asia, with an average annual rate of economic growth of 9 per cent. Over the shorter 
period 1990-97 the country achieved an average annual real GDP growth rate of 7.3 per 
cent (see Table 1 and Table 13)5. From Table 1 it can be seen that real GDP growth was 9 
per cent or over during 1990 and 1991, driven by strong growth in investment 6  and 
consumption expenditure. It then experienced a sharp decline during 1992-93 due, 
primarily, to a significant slowdown in investment expenditure, as well as a decline in 
consumption expenditure, as part of a stabilisation policy to reduce inflationary pressure. 
Growth increased again in 1994 and 1995 due to: the implementation of an expansionary 
economic plan under the new government led by Kim Young Sam; the opening of domestic 
markets to increased foreign competition; the liberalisation of foreign capital inflows; a 
strong export performance, assisted by a high yen which gave Korean exporters a 
competitive advantage over Japanese exporters; a boom in construction and domestic 
infrastructure investment; and steadily rising private consumption. The business cycle 
peaked in 1995 and the economy began to slow in 1996 and 1997 due to a rapid decline in 
both consumption and investment expenditure and particularly weak export growth in 1996. 
The primary source of growth over the entire period was derived from industrial production 
and more specifically from that of the manufacturing sector (Table 1), however its 
contribution declined in 1996 and 1997. The services sector also made a significant 
contribution to economic growth during the period 1990-97.  
 
By the last quarter of 1995 the economy began to enter a downward phase of the business 
cycle, and during 1996 its performance noticeably deteriorated. The major specific causes 
of this business cycle downturn were: 
• downturns in the semi-conductor, metals and petrochemical businesses. Korea was hit 
by its worst terms of trade conditions since the oil shock of 1979, with a drop in export 
prices beginning in the second quarter of 1995. This had a profound effect on Korea’s 
macroeconomic performance. The effect of the world semi-conductor glut and decline 
in prices of 1996 can be placed on a par with the first (1973) and second (1979) oil 
shocks. The spot price of the industry standard 16M DRAM chips7, fell from US$54 to 
US$8 over the course of 1996 and continued around this level in 1997. The share of 
semi-conductor exports as a share of total Korean exports fell from a record 21 per cent 
in 1995 to 18.9 per cent in 1996. While the volume of its exports continued to grow the 
prices received were much lower, and hence export value growth was reduced, 
• a weakening yen from mid 1995 and into 1996 significantly eroded the price 
competitiveness of Korean products in world markets where Korean and Japanese firms 
competed head on, leaving many Korean producers in a situation where they had to 
compete against similarly priced, but better quality, Japanese products. The lower value 
of the yen reduced the prices of Japanese exports on world markets and forced similar 
cuts in Korean export prices. This was absorbed in reduced corporate profits and 
                                                           
5 For a review of the performance of the economy from the mid 1960s to the late 1980s see Harvie and Lee 
(2003b). 
6 A major contribution to this was the construction of 2 million new houses under a house construction plan 
over the period 1988-91. This ultimately contributed to excess demand in the economy, and a bubble in both 
land and stock prices from 1992-94. 
7 Korea is the world’s largest manufacturer of such chips. 
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contributed to an adverse impact upon the trade and current account balances (see Table 
2), 
• the equipment and infrastructure investment boom of 1994 and 1995 ended leading to 
excess capacity, and was exacerbated by an unanticipated softening of global demand. 
These created a weak investment climate in 1996. In addition, the completion of several 
large-scale projects during 1994 and 1995 accounted for part of the lower growth of 
equipment investment and building construction in 1996. There was global over-supply 
in Korea’s major export sectors such as steel, cars and petrochemicals that also 
suppressed prices after 1996. As a result, Korea’s export volumes increased 
substantially in 1997 but company incomes fell dramatically. This had major financial 
implications for a number of the country’s over-leveraged chaebols (Australian 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade  (1999), Harvie and Lee (2003a), and Smith 
(1998)),  
• structurally, Korean businesses were increasingly suffering from the so called three 
highs: high wages, high interest rates and high land prices. These factors resulted in 
Korea becoming the highest cost country among the Asian tigers (Federation of Korean 
Industry (1996)). In addition, relatively low efficiency, particularly in some sectors such 
as banking, and excessive government regulations created an increasingly difficult and 
less competitive business environment (Kim (1999) and Kim (1995)). This not only had 
adverse implications for prospective foreign investors but contributed to a shift of 
Korean companies to off-shore production locations. 
 
Macroeconomic conditions continued to deteriorate into the early part of 1997, when the 
country experienced its worst labour unrest in history. Over a number of weeks workers 
across the nation went on strike to protest against the introduction of a new law making lay-
offs easier, in conjunction with restricting union activities. The work stoppages caused an 
estimated US$3.15 billion in lost output. Soon after this the country experienced the Hanbo 
debacle. On 23 January South Korea’s second biggest steel company imploded under a 
US$5.9 billion debt, which took out its entire parent group, the then 14th largest Korean 
conglomerate, amidst allegations of corruption involving chaebol owners and government 
officials. The Bank of Korea’s swift injection of 6 trillion won (US$7 billion) in liquidity 
prevented a possible chain reaction of bankruptcies. This made South Korea’s already shaky 
financial system even more so, with many banks becoming loan shy. In addition, with the 
additional liquidity in the system, inflationary concerns deepened, and the government’s 
CPI target of 4.5 per cent for 1997 appeared unlikely. These developments contributed to a 
generally gloomy economic outlook during the early part of 1997. However, the economic 
climate turned decidedly pessimistic by late October 1997 amidst increasing concerns about 
Korea’s ability to service its foreign debt8, 60 per cent of which was of short term maturity 
of 12 months or less, and the deteriorating situation of the corporate and banking sectors. 
The currency contagion afflicting East Asia finally hit the Korean currency and stock 
markets (Park (1998), Park and Rhee (1998), Park and Song (2000) and Radelet and Sachs 
(1998a). This, in conjunction with the implementation of necessary reforms under the 
conditions of the IMF rescue program, contributed to GDP growth slowing to 5 per cent for 
1997.   
                                                           
8 Estimated at this time to be US$130 billion. 
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Despite the fluctuating growth of GDP the unemployment rate remained low during the 
period of the 1990s, at between 2-3 per cent. The unemployment rate declined to only 2 per 
cent at the business cycle peak in 1995, and despite the downturn of the economy from the 
third quarter remained at this rate in 1996. Only in 1997 did the unemployment rate 
increase, and this by some 0.6 percentage points9. Considering that the natural rate of 
unemployment in Korea was estimated at 2.3-2.5 per cent, the actual unemployment rate 
had, therefore, remained low during the period of the 1990s10.  
 
Productivity in Korea appeared to vary with the nature of the business cycle. It improved 
with the growth of the economy and declined during the downward phase of the cycle. Unit 
labour costs also varied with the growth cycle. Unit labour costs grew noticeably during the 
high growth periods of 1990-91 and 1994-95, but slowed during the downturns in 1992-93 
and 1996-97. 
 
A major and growing strength of the Korea economy, particularly since the mid 1980s and 
even more so during the period of the 1990s, was the country’s high level of savings. As 
noted previously, an important source of growth for the economy during the period of the 
1990s was its high level of investment. Table 1 shows that the country’s saving rate 
remained at around 33-37.5 per cent of GNDI during the period of the 1990s. This enabled 
the country to maintain its very high level of investment. The country’s investment rate 
remained at a slightly higher level of around 34-40 per cent of GNDI. Hence a substantial 
proportion of its investment requirements were met from domestic sources. However, the 
efficiency of usage of such funds remained a pertinent issue (Harvie and Lee (2003a)). 
 
Consumer price inflation (CPI) was generally on a downward trend during the period of the 
1990s, from relatively high rates in 1990 and 1991, with the exception of 1994. Price 
stability was the government’s primary focus during 1996. The inflation (CPI) rate was a 
stable 4.9 per cent in 1996, up 0.4 percentage points from the previous year, and in the 
upper range of the government’s target. Stable agricultural prices, increased competition 
from imports and subdued consumption led to lower price increases in 1996, particularly in 
the second half of the year. The deterioration of macroeconomic conditions in 1997 resulted 
in a further fall in inflation to 4.5 per cent.   
 
The government’s fiscal position was also strong throughout the 1990s. Starting with 
modest deficits during 1990-92, this turned into modest surpluses from 1993-97. This 
development was a reflection of the prudent monetary and fiscal policies pursued by the 
                                                           
9 This slow increase in the unemployment rate reflected the fact that labour laws made worker lay-offs 
extremely difficult (Kim and Lee (1997)). However with the introduction of labour market reforms and the 
establishment of the Tripartite Commission in January 1998, a body composed of representatives from 
labour, management and government, the Tripartite Social Accord was signed in February 1998 making lay-
offs easier.  
10 However, with the financial crisis in 1997 and subsequent agreement on legalising lay-offs, in conjunction 
with structural change from labour intensive technology intensive industries, resulted in a significantly 
higher unemployment rate of some 6.8 per cent in 1998. 
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authorities during this period. In 1996, for example, Korea’s general government outlays 
and government gross debt were the lowest of all the OECD countries (see OECD (1998), 
p.43). Its financial balance was in surplus and its net debt was actually negative11.  Korea’s 
public sector is small, with the ratio of government outlays to GDP only half the OECD 
average. Budget management was sound. During 1990-95, total government receipts 
remained at 23 per cent of GDP while outlays were 20 per cent of GDP. Its position as a net 
creditor was shared by few other OECD countries. Unlike other OECD countries where 
social security transfers averaged more than 15 per cent of GDP, before the economic crisis 
in Korea such transfers were a little over 2 per cent of GDP (Australian Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade  (1999)). 
 
Korean interest rates, nominal and real, remained relatively high during the period of the 
1990s, a reflection of the country’s heavily protected domestic financial markets (Kim 
(1997), and Park (1996))). The corporate bond yield varied between 11.8-18.9 per cent over 
this time. Fluctuating nominal interest rates in conjunction with generally declining 
inflation rates contributed to quite volatile real interest rates during the period of the 1990s, 
and particularly so during the latter half of this period. Such fluctuations resulted in major 
problems for the heavily leveraged chaebols, and represented a further financial burden on 
less favoured small and medium sized enterprises during periods where real interest rates 
were rising. The deterioration in financial markets from late October 1997, and the terms of 
the IMF rescue package, resulted in interest rates rising to over 25 per cent, creating even 
more problems for the heavily leveraged corporate sector. 
 
Domestic stock markets also experienced a roller-coaster ride during the period of the 
1990s. The stock market price index remained relatively stable in the early part of the 1990s 
before increasing dramatically in 1993-1994, with an equally spectacular sustained decline 
thereafter until the crash in 1997 (Harvie and Lee (2003a)).   
 
  
3. External developments 
 
International trade for Korea, as with the other tiger economies, has been the key to its 
economic development (Cho (1994), Economist (1998), Harvie and Lee (2003a), Harvie 
and Lee (2003b), Sohn, Yang and Yim (1998), Westphal (1990), and World Bank (1993)). 
By the mid 1990s Korea emerged as a major trading nation, being the world’s twelfth 
largest exporter by value in 1996 at US$129.7 billion, with a 2.4 per cent share of world 
exports, and the world’s eleventh largest importing nation by value at US$150.3 billion 
equivalent to 2.8 per cent of world imports (see Table 2). This section briefly reviews the 
country’s international trade and investment developments during the period of the 1990s.  
 
 
                                                           
11 Of all the OECD economies only Norway also had a negative government net debt, which was larger than 
Korea’s, and only Norway had a government financial surplus which was again larger than Korea’s. This 
position, however, deteriorated considerably from 1998 with the onset of the economic crisis and the fiscal 
commitments required by the government to re-capitalise the banking sector in particular.  
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International trade flows 
 
During the 1990s Korea sustained a high growth of exports, with the exception of the 
general slowdown in 1996 and 1997. However, this rapid growth of exports occurred in 
conjunction with an equally rapid growth of imports (see Table 2). Consequently, the 
country ran persistent trade and current account deficits during the period of the 1990s with 
the exception of 1993. After 1995 there was a noticeable deterioration in the current 
account deficit from US$8.5 billion (1.9 per cent of GDP) to a blow-out level of US$23 
billion (4.7 per cent of GDP) in 1996. While export growth slowed so too did import 
growth, but by a much smaller amount.  
 
The country’s dependence on heavy industry at the expense of light industry, and 
manufacturing at the expense of services, is most clearly demonstrated by over-dependence 
for its exports on a few key industries such as cars, ships, steel, petrochemicals and semi-
conductors12 (Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade  (1997 and 1998)). This 
made the country particularly susceptible to changes in global prices for these goods. As 
indicated in Table 3 exports are dominated by machinery and transport equipment, 
manufactured goods and chemicals. In 1990 these alone contributed 93.4 per cent of total 
exports, and their contribution remained around 90 per cent of total exports by 1996-9713. 
During 1995-96, the decline in demand and prices of global (DRAM) semi-conductors, as 
well as lower prices for steel, rising labour costs, declining per capita productivity and the 
weakening of the Japanese yen, all combined to reduce the growth of export values and 
competitiveness and contributed heavily to the current account deficit in 1996 as well as the 
slowdown in GDP growth (Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (1999)). 
The impact on Korea’s economy of the decline in the spot price for the industry standard 
16M DRAM chips from US$54 to US$8 in 1996 has been placed on a par with the first 
(1973) and second (1979) oil price shocks. Many Korean firms were hit hard. For instance, 
Samsung’s profits on semi-conductors fell from US$3 billion in 1995 to a mere US$190 
million in 1996, a drop in profits of 93 per cent. The LG Economic Research Institute 
estimated that 90 per cent of the increase in the current account deficit in 1996 was 
attributable to the drop in export prices. While export values improved modestly in 1997, 
the slowdown in the economy in this year reduced imports and significantly reduced the 
current account deficit to US$8.2 billion (1.8 per cent of GDP). 
 
Imports, with the exception of 1992 and 1993, also grew rapidly during the 1990s, but most 
noticeably over the period 1994-95. Imports increased in 1995 by 32.1 per cent to the value 
of US$135.1 billion, fuelled by increased imports of capital goods (32.5 per cent), industrial 
materials (32.6 per cent) and consumer goods (27.8 per cent). Substantial imports of 
machinery and equipment were apparent for the economy during the period of the 1990s, 
and as a proportion of total imports they were increasing. Such imports had been essential 
                                                           
12 Industries in which the chaebols concentrated their development (Lee and Lee (1996), Sohn, Yang and 
Yim (1998) and Westphal (1990)). 
13 For example, the top ten export items accounted for 53 per cent of the total value of shipments in 1995, up 
from 50 per cent in 1994. These, in addition to other manufactured goods, accounted for 85 per cent of 
exports. 
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to the expansion and upgrading of production facilities, but they contributed considerably to 
the country’s worsening trade balance (OECD (1996, 1998, 1999)). A reduction in tariff 
barriers over the period 1988-96 also contributed to this surge in imports. Economic 
reforms, as well as a further reduction in tariff barriers, were seen as being vital to enhance 
the international competitiveness of domestic companies, and to enable the economy to take 
the fullest advantage of its further integration into the global economy (see Table 4). As 
with exports, imports of machinery and equipment, in addition to other manufactured 
goods, dominated total imports, contributing, for example, some 55 per cent of the total in 
1997 (see Table 3). This, in conjunction with imports of commodities and consumer goods, 
contributed to the record US$23 billion current account deficit in 1996. Developments in 
Korea’s import structure, therefore, reflected the country’s restructuring efforts (OECD 
(1998)). As its production capability shifted to a higher value added scale so too did its 
import items become higher value added, a phenomenon that caused rising trade deficits 
with developed countries. In 1995 Korea’s trade deficit with developed countries stood at 
US$29.1 billion compared with a trade surplus of US$19.2 billion with developing 
countries. Import growth decelerated to 11.3 per cent in 1996 from 32.1 per cent in 1995, in 
response to weaker investment and slower export growth. However, imports of consumer 
goods rose by 22 per cent in part due to: the removal of import barriers; increasing 
affluence; and a declining loyalty to domestic products. With the onset of the financial crisis 
in 1997, import growth became a negative 3.8 per cent14. 
  
Direction of trade flows 
 
The country’s major trading partners during the period of the 1990s are shown in Table 5. 
These consisted primarily of the developed economies of the USA, Japan and the EU, 
which together constituted about a half of Korea’s total trade in 1996 but falling to about 46 
per cent of total trade in 1997. The increasing significance of China as a trading partner is 
also worthy of note. Despite the dominance of the three major economic superpowers in 
Korea’s trade, a clear trend began emerging in Korean exports away from the mature 
markets of the US and Europe, where Korean products faced severe competition, towards 
emerging markets such as China, Eastern Europe, south-east Asia and South America 
(Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade  (1997 and 1998)). In 1996 developing 
countries emerged as Korea’s largest export destination, accounting for 50.9 per cent 
(US$62.6 billion) of total exports (see Table 6). Another key feature of Korea’s trade is the 
large deficits it has with advanced countries (specifically the US, the EU and Japan) and the 
large surpluses it has with developing countries (OECD (1998)). For example, Korea’s total 
trade with ASEAN countries in 1996 reached US$32.3 billion, with exports of US$20.2 
billion and imports of US$12.1 billion. The ASEAN countries now represent Korea’s fourth 
largest trading partner after the USA, Japan and the EU. Also, Korea enjoys the second 
largest bilateral trade surplus in trade with the ASEAN countries, second only to its surplus 
with China. The ASEAN region is also a major destination for Korean investment and 
technological cooperation, which drives exports of machinery and electronic components. It 
is also an important destination for Korea’s construction orders that totalled US$4 billion in 
1996. Hence developments in this market had become of critical importance. The financial 
                                                           
14 During the depth of the economic crisis in 1998 imports collapsed dramatically.  
 
 9 
and economic crisis in the ASEAN countries during 1997 and 1998 was, therefore, of 
particular concern and importance to Korea. 
 
Imports have, like exports, shown a trend away from the industrialised economies to the 
developing countries (see Table 7). However, in this case, overall imports are still 
dominated by the industrial economies and particularly that from the USA, Japan and the 
EU (Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade  (1998)). Given the efforts by the 
country during the 1990s to enhance its global competitiveness and move into higher value 
added production, this has required the importation of higher value added, more 
technologically advanced, equipment and machinery which could only be obtained from 
these technologically advanced economies.  
 
International investment 
 
The extent of foreign direct investment in Korea and Korean investment overseas is 
contained in Tables 8 and 9. Table 8 indicates that the extent of foreign direct investment in 
Korea has been very small, and certainly by comparison to that observable elsewhere in the 
region, and is indicative of the general perception by overseas investors that Korea is not an 
attractive country within which to invest (OECD (1998)). Among the reasons cited for this 
perception are: high wage rates; high land prices; expensive finance; abuse of intellectual 
property rights; requirements that profits be reinvested; and excessive government 
regulation (see also Table 10).  These problems required urgent attention by the authorities, 
given the important role that such investment could play in attracting and upgrading the 
technology used in the country.  
 
Historically, Korea has also been less than receptive to foreign direct investment (Australian 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (1999)). Korea’s home-grown development 
utilised domestic savings, foreign borrowings by the financial sector, and state directed 
loans to industry (Borensztein and Lee (1999), Lee and Lee (1996), Sohn, Yang and Yim 
(1998) and Westphal (1990)). The policy resulted in a very low rate of FDI penetration and 
its cost has been that Korea missed out on the direct transfer of technology, management 
and marketing know-how that such FDI can bring. Since the mid 1990s, however, FDI has 
emerged as a central pillar of economic policy, addressing the goals of developing new 
Korean industries and facilitating technology transfer. In an effort to restructure industry by 
inducing strategic high tech transfers from advanced countries, Korea attempted to attract 
FDI and encourage Korean corporations to enter into strategic alliances with foreign 
companies. In late 1994 the government reaffirmed its policy of encouraging foreign 
investment in Korea by reducing corporate tax on foreign invested firms, relaxing 
regulations on foreign ownership of land, and simplifying approval procedures (Australian 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (1999)). Particular effort was concentrated on 
attracting more Japanese investment in the area of auto parts, electric/electronic parts, and 
machinery industries, as Japanese manufacturers diversified their production bases in the 
mid 1990s to overseas countries in order to reduce increased production costs arising from 
the strength of the yen. Subsequently, the liberalisation of FDI policy resulted in a rapid 
increase of inflows of foreign investment into Korea from the mid 1990s. In 1995, inflows 
of foreign direct investment amounted to 578 projects/transactions valued at US$1.9 billion, 
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an increase from US$1.3 billion in 1994 and almost double the flow in 1993. In 1996 it 
reached US$3.2 billion, in 1997 US$7 billion, and rising further to US$8.9 billion in 1998 
(see Table 8). 
 
As identified by Table 8 FDI is dominated by that from the developed economies, with the 
USA, Japan and Europe contributing 79 per cent of total FDI inflows in 1995, 68 per cent 
in 1996, 84 per cent in 1997, and 73 per cent in 1998. By sector, investment in chemicals, 
foodstuffs, and electronics remained strong until 1996, but thereafter a significant change 
has taken place. From 1997 FDI in foodstuffs, machinery, electronics, financial services and 
hotels and tourism have increased the most. However the pattern remains variable.   
 
With the onset of the financial crisis after November 1997, all levels of government 
acknowledged that foreign investment would have to be a central part of Korea’s 
restructuring and recovery program (World Bank (1999)). The immediate objective of 
attracting foreign investment was to put Korean companies on to a sound financial footing 
and to assist with economic restructuring. However, other factors advanced for the 
attraction of FDI included transfer of technology and know-how, and access to foreign 
supply chains. To this end foreign investment was liberalised further in 199815. In May 
1998, Korea boasted a 98 per cent rate of liberalistion, which meant that out of the 1,600 
industrial sectors classified by the government only 31 were restricted for foreign 
investment. This was a significant improvement on the situation just a few years previously, 
when the figure was around 85 per cent. 
 
The Korean government also announced that foreign investment would be opened fully in 
all industries, except for industries where there were national security or cultural concerns 
(e.g. coastal fisheries, media) or where industries were subject to international negotiations 
for foreign investment (e.g. communication and shipping industries) (OECDE (1999)). FDI 
application procedures were simplified and laws amended so that foreigners were treated 
equally with nationals in the purchase of land and real estate. The Korean government also 
continues to offer incentives to foreign companies in high technology industries and in 
designated export zones. The include company and income tax exemptions, and low rents 
on land. Local governments have also been allowed to establish free investment zones as 
part of their policy to attract foreign investment. Change has also occurred at the social 
level. The historical community resistance to foreign investment also crumbled in the face 
of rising unemployment (Lee and Lee (2000)). 
 
As a consequence of an easing of the regulatory regime the stock of outward investment by 
Korean companies reached US$10.2 billion at the end of 1995, focused mainly in North 
America where investments were 14.2 per cent of the total. However, in terms of recent 
Korean investment overseas an increasingly clearer pattern has emerged, as indicated in 
Table 9, with investment moving away from the traditionally favoured destinations such as 
the USA to south-east Asian countries and China in particular. The exception to this trend 
being the case of North America in 1996. The share of investment in Asia other than China 
has remained remarkably stable during the period of the 1990s, at around 28-29 per cent of 
                                                           
15 Meergers and acquisitions became the main vehicle for FDI in 1998. 
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total investment overseas, although the composition of this has primarily moved to south-
east Asia. On the other hand China emerged as a major recipient of investment by Korean 
firms, increasing from only US$16 million in 1990, or 1.7 per cent of the total in this year, 
to US$824 million in 1995, equivalent to 28.6 per cent of the total. However since 1996 
there was a reversal in this upward trend of investment to China, falling to US$633 million 
in 1997 or 19.6 per cent of the total. This overseas investment development is indicative of 
the increasing concern that Korean labour intensive manufacturing industries, such as in 
textiles, footwear and fabricated metals in particular that are dominated by small and 
medium sized firms, have over a loss of competitiveness resulting from rising domestic 
wages. Hence, to offset a decline in price competitiveness, Korean companies have sought 
to relocate some of their less competitive manufacturing and assembly facilities in lower 
cost countries such as China, Vietnam, Indonesia and, more recently, North Korea. China, 
in particular, is seen as the most desirable country for investment because of its proximity, 
cheap labour and huge market potential. Asia, including China, therefore received about 50 
per cent of total Korean overseas investment in 1997, compared with only 30 per cent in 
1990. The relative significance of North America as a destination for such investment by 
Korean firms declined by 1997, where it was 23 per cent of the total, relative to 1990 where 
it was 45.7 per cent of the total. On the other hand, the relative position of Europe improved 
from 6.7 per cent of the total in 1990 to 10.8 per cent of the total in 1997.  
 
After 10 October 1995, all Korean companies were required to source at least 20 per cent of 
projected investment capital in overseas projects of US$100 million or more from internal 
sources or from their own capital, reserves or cash-flow. This policy was designed to slow 
Korea’s increasing foreign debt, and also to allay government concerns that many 
companies were over-extending themselves (OECD (1997)). 
 
External debt 
 
As indicated in Table 2, Korea’s gross foreign debt increased steadily during the period of 
the 1990s, with the most significant increase taking place from 1994 onwards16. Gross 
foreign debt increased to US$105 billion by the end of 1996, almost double the same figure 
in 1994, and this debt was equivalent to 20.1 per cent of GDP. This compared with a figure 
of around 12.6 per cent of GDP at the end of 1990. The increase was due mostly to the 
significant deterioration in the trade deficit and expanded borrowing from overseas to meet 
increased facility investment. By the end of 1997 gross foreign debt stood at US$120.8 
billion, a total debt equivalent to 25.3 per cent of GDP. Net foreign debt also increased 
steadily during the period of the 1990s. Not only was their increasing concern about the 
build up of this debt, but also of its increasing short-term nature and the country’s ability to 
repay it. Short-term debt as a proportion of the total debt stood at 57.5 per cent by the end 
of 1996, up from around 30 per cent of the total in the early 1990s (Corsetti, Pesenti and 
Roubini (1998), Economist (1998, Jwa and Huh (1998), Kwon (1998), Lee (1999a) and 
Park (1998)).  
 
                                                           
16 This also corresponds with developments in international capital markets. After 1994, following the Latin 
American financial crisis, capital inflows into the emerging market economies of East Asia noticeably 
increased.  
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The sharp rise in foreign debt, particularly in the form of short-term debt, was due to four 
factors. First, the government expanded the scope for short-term foreign currency 
borrowing in 1993 when it permitted enterprises to borrow from abroad either directly or 
through Korean banks, to finance imports of capital goods17. While liberalising loans of less 
than one year, restrictions on long-term overseas borrowing were maintained18 (Australian 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (1999)). Consequently, there was a dramatic rise 
in short-term foreign debt as Korean financial institutions borrowed abroad to finance the 
investment boom. In contrast to some south-east Asian countries, however, the increased 
debt did not lead to a speculative bubble in asset prices. Land prices, which had risen at a 
rapid pace in the second half of the 1980s and early 1990s, were basically stable prior to the 
crisis. Instead, foreign borrowing primarily financed an expansion of industrial capacity that 
proved to be excessive. Second, overseas borrowing was facilitated by a jump in the 
number of financial institutions dealing in foreign currency, following the licensing of 24 
merchant banks between 1994 and 199619. Third, the widespread perception that the won 
was undervalued during much of the 1990s encouraged borrowing from overseas. Fourth, 
the implicit government guarantee of financial institutions created a moral hazard that 
encouraged high levels of borrowing by Korean banks and lending by their foreign creditors 
(Borensztein and Lee (1999)). However, it was not just the rise in short term debt that left 
Korea vulnerable to a financial crisis, but the fact that it was combined with a lack of sound 
risk management at banks which were inexperienced in the area of overseas borrowing. The 
new merchant banks, in particular, took on high levels of liquidity and exchange rate risk20. 
Moreover there was a lack of prudential supervision; basic regulations, such as capital 
adequacy ratios for merchant banks, did not exist. 
 
While concerns over the accumulation of short-term debt increased, these concerns were 
compounded by the rapid deterioration in the country’s foreign reserves. This became of 
particular concern from 1994 onwards as short-term debt increasingly exceeded foreign 
exchange reserves (see Table 2). Although foreign exchange reserves accumulated rapidly 
during the 1990s to stand at US$33.2 billion by the end of 1996, there was US$93.3 billion 
worth of short-term debt at the same point in time. Worse still was the steep decline in 
                                                           
17 This move reflected the government’s strategy of beginning capital account liberalisation with trade related 
financial flows, which were not considered to be a threat to the conduct of monetary policy based on quantity 
controls. Direct overseas borrowing was limited to four categories of borrowers: SMEs; companies investing 
in public infrastructure projects; subsidiaries of foreign companies in technology based business areas; and 
companies paying foreign debt prematurely. For indirect borrowing through Korean banks, SMEs could 
borrow 100 per cent of the value of capital good imports. For large firms, borrowing was limited to 90 per 
cent in manufacturing and 80 per cent in services until May 1995, when the ceiling was lowered to 70 per 
cent.  
18  Those wishing to obtain long-term foreign loans had to provide detailed information and obtain the 
approval of the Ministry of Finance and Economy, while short term borrowers faced no such requirement. 
19 The merchant banks had previously operated as finance companies, which were not allowed to deal in 
foreign currencies. After becoming “merchant banks”, they continued to operate as short-term finance 
companies. In addition, commercial banks opened 28 foreign branches between 1994 and 1996. 
20 The liquidity risk reflected a maturity mismatch - a high ratio of short-term liabilities to assets. For the 
merchant banks, 64 per cent of their borrowings were short term while 85 per cent of their loans were long 
term (Chang, Park and Yoo (1998)). The foreign exchange risk was due to the failure of most corporations to 
hedge their foreign currency loans. Consequently, the depreciation of the won resulted in a deterioration of 
the banks’ balance sheets. 
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foreign exchange reserves to US$19.7 by the end of 1997. This was largely due to the Bank 
of Korea’s aggressive intervention in the foreign currency market, aimed at stabilising the 
value of the won in the face of the sizeable deterioration in the current account position 
(Park (1998). By mid December 1997, the deterioration of foreign reserves arising from the 
financial crisis had fallen to an officially disastrously low level of only US$7 billion. It was, 
therefore, not surprising that investors began losing confidence in the currency, requiring 
the Korean authorities to turn to the IMF for financial assistance (Radelet and Sachs (1998a 
and 1998b)). 
 
Exchange rate 
 
The Korean currency experienced a continual depreciation against the US dollar in nominal 
terms during the early part of the 1990s, as can be observed from Table 2. With the 
weakening of the dollar itself against the Japanese yen, this implied a gain in 
competitiveness for Korean products relative to those of Japan. However, from 1994 to 
1995, the won began to appreciate against the dollar, and with the dollar strengthening 
against all major international currencies this resulted in a loss of international 
competitiveness for Korea. The strengthening of the won against the yen had major 
implications for Korea’s competitiveness vis a vis Japan in Asian markets (Australian 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (1999)). The effects were felt in declining export 
demand for goods such as steel, chemicals, consumer electronic products, petroleum 
products and plastics. This was offset to some extent by the benefits that flowed to the more 
technologically advanced Korean industries that were substantial importers of sophisticated 
Japanese capital goods and technology. 
 
The Korean won depreciated in nominal terms sharply, by about 14 per cent, against the 
dollar in 1996. While this improved the price competitiveness of Korean exports it 
increased the repayment burden of foreign debt, and sharply increased the cost of imported 
raw materials. The key reason for the depreciation included: the strengthening of the US 
dollar; the increase in Korea’s current account deficit; and the reduction in foreign capital 
inflows. More significantly, for Korea’s exports, the won-yen exchange rate did not show 
signs of an improvement, with the depreciation of the won against the yen offset by a sharp 
drop in the value of the yen against the dollar. With the onset of the financial crisis in 1997 
there was a dramatic decline in the nominal value of the won relative to the US dollar, year 
on year, by the end of 1997 by some 91.7 per cent (Park and Rhee (1998)).  
 
This brief overview of macroeconomic conditions in Korea prior to the onset of the crisis 
indicates some of the long-standing strengths that provided the basis for the country’s 
sustained high economic growth over a period of some 35 years. These being: strong export 
growth; moderate inflation; high levels of saving and investment; small external deficits; 
and prudent fiscal policy as exemplified by government financial surpluses. However, they 
also indicate a number of developments that provided the beginnings of a currency crisis. 
These developments included: the drastic slowdown in export growth experienced by Korea 
particularly in 1996; a significant deterioration in current account deficits which became 
unsustainable over the medium to long term; indications of over-investment in the domestic 
economy, particularly the years 1994 and 1995, which resulted in over-capacity and an 
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increasing dependence on US dollar denominated foreign capital flows to fund this; related 
to the previous, an increasingly heavy reliance on short term capital flows.  
 
The following section looks in detail at structural weaknesses in the economy that were 
developing during the period of time under review. A number of these were insufficiently 
apparent by merely reviewing macroeconomic data alone.  
 
 
4. Developing structural weaknesses 
 
Korea’s macroeconomic trends until October 1997 obscured the dichotomy between a 
benign real economy on the one hand, and weak profitability, an excessively indebted 
corporate sector, and a poorly supervised and shaky financial system on the other 
(Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (1999), Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini 
(1998), Economist (1998), Kwon (1998), Lee (1999a and 1999b), Min (1998), Park (1998) 
and Radelet and Sachs (1998a and 1998b)). In the past high GDP growth had masked many 
of Korea’s financial problems, and perhaps lulled regulators and investors into 
complacency. It became clear, however, that during the 1990s structural weaknesses and 
policy errors were making Korea increasingly vulnerable to potential financial turbulence 
that did, ultimately, appear in 1997. Three fundamental weaknesses appeared. First, the 
corporate sector was characterised by a low level of profitability and high levels of debt, 
reflecting the tendency of the business conglomerates to diversify into capital-intensive 
industries. Second, Korea had a poorly functioning financial system that was further 
weakened by a string of major corporate bankruptcies in 1997. Third, Korea’s short term 
foreign debt was high relative to its international reserves, a consequence of its decision to 
liberalise short term borrowing rather than direct investment inflows (Australian 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (1999)). The remainder of this section explores 
each of these aspects and their interrelatedness in more depth. 
 
Chaebol-government-banking sector relationship (Inefficient Government-driven 
Capitalism) 
Many problems began to occur in Korea’s industrial and financial sectors, particularly since 
the late 1980s, arising from the close relationship between the government, banking system 
and the chaebols21 (Joh (1999), Kim (1995), Lee and Lee (1996), Smith (1998), Sohn, Yang 
                                                           
21 The chaebol, Korea’s large business conglomerates that consist of numerous corporate enterprises engaged 
in diverse export oriented businesses, dominated the economy. The top five groups alone accounted for about 
10 per cent of GDP and the top four accounted for about 14 per cent of manufacturing output. World wide 
sales by the top four chaebol alone was equivalent to 47 per cent of South Korea’s total output, the combined 
revenues of the top 49 chaebol was equivalent to 97 per cent of the country’s GDP, and they also accounted 
for nearly half of its exports. The 30 largest chaebol just about controlled the entire economy if downstream 
suppliers and all the small businesses and their employees that depended on them were included. There was 
considerable replication amongst the chaebol, resulting in thin profit margins for all. Each of the top three 
chaebol, for example, had well over 100 businesses, but 80 per cent of the revenues came from 20 per cent of 
the businesses, and virtually all the profit from just one or two. Combined profits amounted to a paltry 
US$65 million in 1996, according to Goldman Sachs (1998), giving the chaebols an average return on equity 
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and Yim (1998) and World Bank (1999), Yoo (1997) and Yoo and Lim (1997)). While 
government led policy over a period of 30 years had produced rapid growth and 
industrialisation of the economy, by the 1990s the increased complexity of the Korean 
economy and developments in the global economy made this institutionalised system 
become outmoded (see Harvie and Lee (2003))22. The system contributed to a number of 
difficulties: inefficiency in resource allocation; excessively over-leveraged and financially 
fragile enterprises; concentrated economic power in large business groups; an emphasis on 
growth with resulting over-capacity arising from a neglect of profit and risk considerations; 
overly close relations between the government and corporate sector resulted in 
institutionalised corruption23 and complacency; the preferential treatment of the chaebol and 
their resulting dominance in the economy hindered entrepreneurialism and resulted in 
imbalances in the economy by constraining the growth of small and medium sized 
enterprises and reducing the flexibility and adaptability of the economy; stifled the 
development of a mature industrial relations system; the development of protected domestic 
markets and a general lack of competition; a loss of international competitiveness as the 
chaebol were insufficiently integrated into the global economy (Australian Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade (1999)).  
Accordingly, capital, production and exports were heavily skewed towards the chaebols, 
with myriad cross-guarantees on borrowing, and limited transparency and accountability. A 
‘too big to fail’ mentality of chaebols resulted in their excessive risk-taking, over-
investment, and insufficient attention to credit and exchange rate risks, conducted in an 
environment where the government bureaucracy colluded with big business in officially 
sanctioned deals (Sohn, Yang and Yim (1998)). Over-indebtedness, over-capacity and poor 
earning power among chaebols was a natural outcome. In addition, excessive government 
control of the banking system made banking institutions rely more on government 
intervention than on profit-first business. This, in turn, resulted in the misguided advancing 
of bank loans to non-viable or insolvent borrowers. Consequently, active government 
involvement in the market resulted not only in corruption, but also in moral hazard and 
inefficiency in the general economic sector, and a weakening of the competitiveness of 
enterprises and banks. While some of these difficulties proved not to be significant in the 
context of Korea’s growing economy, they left Korea vulnerable to shocks in an 
increasingly globalised financial market. During the period of economic downturn in 1996 
and 1997 they combined to produce severe problems for the economy.  
Weak corporate sector  
 
Korea’s corporate sector is characterised as being traditionally excessively indebted, a 
legacy of Korea’s ambitious strategy of achieving rapid growth on a global scale by 
diversifying into capital intensive industries to “leap-frog” quickly up the value added chain 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
of only 3 per cent, while thirteen of the top 30 chaebol made losses in 1996. Hence their emphasis was upon 
growth, but it was profitless growth.  
22  At least until the early 1980s strong government leadership was somewhat necessary and desirable, 
because the size of the domestic market was small, the structure of domestic industry was rather simple, and 
Korea’s exposure to the world market was limited. 
23 That is intervention by the government in the process of extending loans to the family controlled chaebols 
and in deciding major state funded projects for political kickbacks. 
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into higher technology products (Harvie and Lee (2003b)). Although this approach had been 
successful in the 1970s and 1980s, when Korean firms were relatively small and achieving 
economies of scale and establishing extensive distribution channels were critical to 
increasing productivity and shareholder value, by the late 1980s global competitive 
conditions had changed radically and past strategies of debt financed growth became 
increasingly risky in the face of falling profitability. It also proved to be ill suited for an 
environment of keen competition in the 1990s. Part of this dependence on debt also 
reflected supply side factors, notably an aversion to foreign direct investment, an 
underdeveloped equity market and tax advantages related to debt finance. The corporate 
sector was characterised by agency problems, moral hazard problems, and a poor 
governance system (Chang, Park and Yoo (1998), Harvie (2004), Kim (1995), Lee and Lee 
(1996), Nam et al. (1999), and Yoo and Lim (1997)).   
 
By the end of 1997 the average debt to equity ratio of the corporate sector was around 400 
per cent, equivalent to 167 per cent of GDP. For the thirty largest conglomerates the average 
ratio was even higher at 519 per cent, about 100 percentage points higher than in 1996 and 
the previous five years, in sharp contrast with 154 per cent in the United States and 193 per 
cent in Japan, raising serious questions about corporate governance and viability (see Table 
11) (Nam et al. (1999)). Such debt imposed onerous debt service costs on corporate cash 
flow. This cost amounted to around 17 per cent of total business costs in 1997, more than 
three times the level in the United States and Japan. Interest expenses in the manufacturing 
sector increased from 5.5 per cent of sales in 1995 to 6.8 per cent in 1997. This aggravated 
the already low levels of profitability of Korean companies, which had a history of low 
levels of profitability24. Worse still was that by 1996 there had been a rapid build up of 
short term domestic and foreign debt, particularly during 1994-95, to finance the investment 
boom of the large conglomerates. Some two thirds of corporate debt was short term, about a 
quarter of which was foreign debt, leaving cash starved firms exposed to: tighter short term 
credit lines; unanticipated declines in the won and global financial markets; and interest 
rates. This increased reliance on short-term borrowing, probably reflected attempts to 
reduce interest costs by borrowing at shorter maturities. 
 
Other salient features of Korea’s corporate sector (non financial, non agricultural 
corporations) include25: thin business profit margins and poor shareholders’ returns (which 
averaged 6.2 per cent from 1990 to 1996, barely one half the growth of nominal GDP and a 
third of that achieved in the US), despite an unrivalled record of economic growth since 
1963; very low stockholders’ equity, which dropped by a third in the course of 1997; high 
and rising debt service as a proportion of corporate cash flow particularly since 1996 and 
1997 (Harvie (2004) and Sohn (2002)). Indeed, financial costs at between 15-17 per cent of 
total business costs in 1996-97 were three times higher than in the US, Japan and Taiwan. 
Heavy debt service is a quintessential feature of fragile firms. Combined with rigid lay off 
laws, weak cash flow and cross debt guarantees, this presented a recipe for serial 
bankruptcies and high systemic risk. In fact, a crucial pressure point between weak 
                                                           
24 For example, between 1986 and 1995 net income to total assets in manufacturing averaged only 2.3 per 
cent, only about half the rate in the USA. 
25 See for example OECD (1998), pp 26-29. 
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microeconomic structures and slower economic growth proved to be the corporate sector’s 
weak balance sheet and cash flow positions. Although 1995 was a cyclical peak for 
profitability, reflecting the rapid growth of the electronics sector, the rise in interest costs 
exposed the fragility of firms to the terms of trade shock that started in 1996. Primarily as a 
result of an 80 per cent collapse in semiconductor prices, overall export prices in dollar 
terms fell by 13 per cent in 1996, an amount equivalent to 4 per cent of national income, 
and another 16 per cent in 1997. At the same time, export volume growth decelerated and 
over-capacity emerged in key export sectors following an investment boom concentrated in 
semi-conductors, cars, steel and petrochemicals. With firms unable to lay off redundant 
workers and to reduce labour costs, net income dropped to 0.5 per cent of manufacturing 
sales in 1996.  
 
Despite a modest recovery in profit margins a critical point was reached around mid 1997, 
when, faced with slumping operating income due to slower growth and the decline in the 
terms of trade and rising financial costs, the corporate sector’s net income turned negative 
and corporate cash flow was caught in a savage squeeze. This, in conjunction with the 
depreciation of the won later in the year, triggered a 50 per cent jump in the number of 
insolvencies in 1997 and a sharp increase in the rate of default. This included, although 
large-scale bankruptcies in Korea had been quite rare, eight of the thirty largest chaebols 
(Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (1999)). This included major groups 
such as Hanbo, Jinro, Sammi, Halla and, most importantly, the Kia group which was the 
country’s 8th largest chaebol26 (see Table 12). They represented around 4 percent of the 
assets of non-farm, non-financial businesses. Financial market confidence was particularly 
shaken in January 1997 by the first insolvency, that of Hanbo Steel (part of Korea’s 14th 
largest conglomerate). The scale of the ensuing bribes for loans scandal was stunning, even 
for a Korean public long hardened to ‘cosy’ arrangements; and foreign investors’ 
confidence appeared to have been irrevocably shaken. At this point some foreign banks 
began to reduce their exposure to Korea, first by cutting back their credit lines. This fragile 
situation calmed in Spring 1997, in part because Korean banks, facing strong pressure to 
keep ‘solvent’ firms afloat, entered into a voluntary “Standstill Agreement” in April to 
avoid driving “solvent” firms into receivership (albeit at the cost of weakening their own 
balance sheets)27. But this respite proved short lived. These developments in the corporate 
sector had major implications for the third partner in Korea Inc. – the banks. 
Weak financial system  
The surge in corporate insolvencies had a devastating impact on the second critical area of 
structural weakness - Korea’s financial system (Radelet and Sachs (1998a and 1998b), 
Smith (1998)). Corporate problems, albeit severe, could, perhaps, have been contained if 
the financial system had been adequately capitalised and well supervised. However, the 
                                                           
26 On the basis of total assets in 1997. 
27 Participating banks agreed for a fixed period to abstain from calling in their loans or exercising their 
claims against certain firms on the brink of insolvency because of temporary funding problems. During this 
grace period, the possibility of turning the firm around was assessed. If the assessment was positive, the 
firm’s rehabilitation program was supported by a consortium of banks. In 1997, Jinro, Daenong, Kia Motors 
and Tail-Jung Mil came under this agreement. In the event the standstill agreement proved futile, as most of 
these firms eventually entered into “work-out” programs or into court receivership later in 1997. 
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opposite was true, and this further weakened foreign confidence. While Korea’s 
manufacturing sector had been developed to a stage not far behind that of the world's 
leading industrialised countries, its financial sector was quite unsophisticated. Although the 
banks were privatised in the early 1980s they lacked dynamism because the government 
continued to exert a high degree of influence over their management. They also lacked 
experience as profit-seeking entities expected to adhere to stringent prudential standards, 
and, consequently, strong governance practices failed to emerge (Australian Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade. (1999).  
During the 1990s Korea’s banking sector was characterised by: poor and declining levels of 
profitability as measured by the return on assets and equity; steadily deteriorating capital 
adequacy ratios; and tight interest margins, partly reflecting competition from new entrants 
after 1991 (see Table 13)28  (OECD (1999)). The poor profitability performance was a 
reflection of increased competition from the non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs), which 
were permitted to enter into direct competition with the banks in the 1980s and 1990s. 
While the NBFIs faced relatively lax restrictions the banks remained subject to 
comparatively tight restrictions. In addition, the banks’ limited control over costs, combined 
with regulations on product innovation, tended to depress bank profitability further29.    
 
Official figures suggested steadily declining bank non-performing loans (NPLs) as a 
proportion of total loans during the 1990s, reaching a low of 4.1 per cent of their total credit 
in 1996 before increasing sharply to 6 per cent in 1997. While the ratio was not especially 
high by past standards in Korea, the increase was troubling in the context of financial 
turbulence in the south-east Asian countries which were also characterised by weak 
financial systems and poor corporate governance practices. In addition, there was concern 
about transparency: the deterioration of the banks’ health was not fully reflected in the 
reported statistics because of loose loan classification standards and accounting rules; there 
was only partial recognition of stock revaluation losses; and there was inadequate loan-loss 
provisions30. 
The chronically poor quality of the existing banks’ loan portfolios became further 
undermined by the squeeze on corporate profits starting in mid 1996 and into 199731. Non-
performing loans were already on the rise, especially among banks with a legacy of 
                                                           
28 In fact, commercial and merchant banks’ capital adequacy ratios were barely one half of officially declared 
rates, owing to regulatory forbearance concerning past investment losses. 
29 While employment by banks in most countries remained steady or declined, it increased by about 25 per 
cent in Korea from 1990 to 1996 (see Table 13). 
30 For example, while official figures put Korean banks’ bad loans at the end of June 1997 at only 6.1 per 
cent of total loans outstanding, if international provisioning norms were applied the figure would have been 
more than 15 per cent. At the nine largest institutions bad loans already ranged from 94 per cent to 376 per 
cent of the banks’ capital, hence most of these banks were technically insolvent. In short, Korea’s financial 
system was probably twice as highly geared as portrayed by official data. 
31 It is also worth stressing that not all banks were the same. Those banks that had avoided loan concentration 
to the chaebols and had developed skills in credit analysis tended to perform better. For example, the 
Kookmin Bank has a history of a strong deposit base, as well as specialising in the consumer and medium 
sized company market sector. As a result, credit evaluation skills tended to be better, loan losses lower and 
margins higher. The strongest banks were those that deviated from the predominant pattern of links to policy 
directed loans and high exposure to the chaebols. 
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government directed loans and imprudent exposure to large troubled firms and/or cyclically 
depressed sectors (e.g. Korea First Bank and Seoul Bank32). Aggravating the situation even 
further was the direction given by the Korean authorities for commercial banks to intervene 
in the stock markets. This required in times when the market was overheated for banks to 
sell shares and ease the price down, and in times when the market was too bearish for banks 
to purchase shares and hold them in order to stimulate the market (Harvie and Lee (2003a)). 
As the Korean Composite Stock Index had dropped continuously since mid 1995 banks 
suffered huge losses, exacerbating further the difficulties already facing the commercial 
banks. This was compounded by the deteriorating performance in the corporate sector. By 
late 1996 banks had, therefore, begun to report large losses on share investments and on 
loans to the chaebol. The government of President Kim Young Sam, however, did not 
demand a thorough clean up which would have required closing several major banks and 
forcing some of Korea’s biggest companies into bankruptcy. But the string of chaebol 
bankruptcies in 1997 compounded these difficulties, and resulted in the commercial banks 
having to carry an additional very heavy bad debt burden.   
 
Further, regulations and institutional factors combined to encourage the channelling of 
international borrowing through the financial system for on-lending to corporations. Large 
amounts of foreign currency credit were taken on, directly or indirectly, by Korean financial 
institutions to provide finance for Korean enterprises at home and abroad, and many Korean 
firms took on increasing amounts of short term foreign currency debt of which little was 
hedged (Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (1999)). Between 1993 and 
1996 the foreign exposure of both Korean banks and enterprises nearly doubled, reaching 
almost US$100 billion in 1997.  
There were numerous points of fragility elsewhere in the financial sector. As with the banks 
the non-bank financial institutions also had considerable exposure to the chaebols, and 
significant market risk as well. The merchant banks33, securities companies, and investment 
trust companies all had significant exposure in currency, bond and equity markets. In 
markets where margins were often under pressure, these institutions sought to maintain 
profitability by accepting increased risk (OECD (1998)). Many of these institutions used 
leveraged positions, but most of them lacked risk management capabilities to manage and 
price market risk. While supervisory authorities were relatively unconcerned about the 
adequacy of their risk management systems. 
 
The fragility of the financial system did not happen overnight. Instead, it was a culmination 
of a number of factors that occurred before the corporate and financial crisis in 1997. The 
more important factors include the following: 
                                                           
32 By December 1997 these two banks were effectively insolvent and had to be nationalised. Since this time a 
majority stake in Korea First Bank was sold to Newbridge Capital, a foreign company. A similar effort to sell 
a majority stake in Seoul Bank to the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation proved more difficult. 
33 The merchant banks acted as major financial intermediaries in raising finance for the chaebols, including 
that from overseas. Many of these had considerable involvement by the chaebols in their ownership. They 
found themselves in an increasingly weak financial position because of their over exposure to both the 
chaebol and overseas borrowing. These institutions were ultimately found to be very weak and lacking in 
information transparency  
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(i) Poor supervision and regulation  
The difficulties in the financial system reflected a combination of weakness in the 
supervisory and regulatory framework, together with the legacy of government directed 
lending practices that led to excessive leveraging in the corporate sector and delayed 
necessary restructuring efforts. Strict regulatory and supervisory policies are important for 
minimising moral hazard, including corruption, fraud, and excessive risk taking in the 
banking system. The difficulties faced by the financial sectors in Korea and other East 
Asian economies can be attributed to a lack of prudential supervision in the banking system 
early in the process of financial liberalisation34 (Australian Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade. (1999), Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1998), Kim (1997), Park (1996) and 
Smith (1998)). This lack of supervision was also highly pertinent in the context of the 
NBFIs, and of particular importance in the context of the merchant banks. 
(ii) Heavy intervention by the government in financial institutions  
Commercial bank loans extended to meet government mandated quantitative targets 
weakened the incentive of banks for managing risk. Preferential loans mandated by 
government to key sectors, often re-financed by the central bank at relatively favourable 
interest rates, resulted in banks having little incentive to assess and price their credit risk 
properly (Borensztein and Lee (1999)). Such practices were inconsistent with sound 
banking practice. This resulted in the Korean domestic banking system ending up in a very 
weak position because banks had to carry a debt burden resulting from credit extension to 
uncreditworthy and heavily leveraged chaebol firms.  
(iii) Poor accounting standards and limited information disclosure (transparency) 
Poor accounting standards and limited information disclosure requirements made risk 
assessment of creditors very difficult. In Korea accounting standards were widely perceived 
of as being relatively weak, with the use of borrowed names or the maintenance of multiple 
accounts greatly diminishing the reliability of reported information. Korean regulators did 
not require banks to declare a loan “non performing” until interest had gone unpaid for six 
months, and even then had to set aside only 15 per cent of the loan to cover the loss. 
Tougher standards were phased in during 1998. But until then the financial position of 
Korean banks with foreign investors lacked credibility, since their actual position was likely 
to be worse than their financial reports suggested. Informational difficulties were 
compounded by the fact that before the crisis financial data had been regarded as a state 
secret. For example, on 10 December 1997, the authorities admitted that the country’s short 
term debt exceeded US$100 billion, nearly double the figure it gave the IMF a few weeks 
earlier when the negotiations for a rescue plan had begun (OECD (1998)). 
(iv) Underdeveloped capital markets 
Recent adverse banking experiences emphasise the problems that can arise if banks are 
essentially the sole source of intermediation35. Their breakdown induces a sharp weakening 
                                                           
34 Of particular concern were the trust accounts held by the banks. 
35 This is a common problem faced by developing countries, and indeed is a characteristic of some developed 
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in economic growth. A wider range of non-bank institutions and capital market institutions 
more generally, including viable debt and equity markets, are important safeguards of 
economic activity when banking fails. However, Korea, amongst other economies in East 
Asia, had small and underdeveloped financial markets. Bond markets did not serve as an 
important source of finance for business, nor as an investment outlet for households.   
These factors contributed to financial system vulnerability arising from shifts in 
international investor sentiment, as well as to slower growth of the economy that 
deteriorated banks’ loan portfolios due to the increasing difficulties of non-financial 
corporations. The management, supervision and regulation of financial institutions paid far 
too little attention to prudent analysis and containment of risks. At the end of 1996, 
according to unofficial estimates, banks’ non-performing loans, net of reserves, were 
already equivalent to almost 70 per cent of their equity, and true asset quality may have 
been much worse than this figure indicated. The unprecedented number of chaebol 
insolvencies in 1997 severely weakened the financial system, and non-performing loans 
rose sharply. By October 1997, according to unofficial estimates, over 20 per cent of bank 
loans in Korea were impaired. At the same time the steep declines in stock prices cut the 
value of banks’ equity and further reduced their net worth. While the Korean banking 
system lacked dynamism, showed poor profitability, and was plainly vulnerable to 
deterioration in credit conditions, it did not, however, obviously appear to be on the brink of 
insolvency at least on the basis of official figures. 
Despite all the problems associated with the financial system, there were also some 
favourable aspects. First, the government’s policy of preventing ownership concentration 
meant that tight ownership linkages and conflicts of interest between banking and industry 
were largely absent. Additionally, banks’ direct exposure to the real estate sector, a major 
element in most banking crises since the 1980s, was largely absent, even though banks had 
considerable indirect exposure due to the large amount of lending that was collateralised by 
real estate. 
 
Excessive reliance on short term foreign debt 
 
As indicated in the previous section Korea’s gross foreign debt increased steadily during the 
period of the 1990s, with the most significant increase taking place from 1994 onwards36. 
The significant deterioration in the trade deficit and expanded borrowing from overseas to 
meet increased facility investment were the primary causes. Short-term debt, as a proportion 
of total debt, rose precipitously. Developments such as the expanded scope for short term 
currency borrowings from 1993, increased foreign currency dealings by financial 
institutions, a relatively strong value of the currency, and moral hazard arising from implicit 
guarantees to domestic financial institutions, backed up by a lack of prudential supervision 
and regulations by the authorities, contributed to this structural weakening of the economy 
(Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade,1999).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
countries such as Germany and Japan. 
36 A consequence of financial market deregulation and liberalisation under a ten year government program 
begun in 1993.  
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While concerns over the accumulation of short-term debt increased, these were 
compounded by the rapid deterioration in the country’s foreign reserves. This became of 
particular concern from 1994 onwards as short-term debt increasingly exceeded foreign 
exchange reserves. Although foreign exchange reserves accumulated rapidly during the 
1990s, to stand at US$33.2 billion by the end of 1996, there was a steep decline to US$19.7 
by the end of 1997. This was largely due to the Bank of Korea’s aggressive intervention in 
foreign currency markets aimed at stabilising the value of the won in the face of the sizeable 
deterioration in the current account position. By mid 1997 Korea’s short-term debt to 
foreign exchange reserves compared very unfavourably with its regional neighbours (see 
Figure 1). By mid December 1997 the deterioration of foreign reserves arising from the 
financial crisis had fallen to what has been unofficially put at a disastrously low level of 
only US$7 billion. With this structural weakening of the economy, it was, therefore, not 
surprising that investors began losing confidence in the currency requiring the Korean 
authorities to turn to the IMF for financial assistance. 
 
Figure 1 An international comparison of short-term debt* as a % of foreign-
exchange reserves, June 1997 
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Source: BIS; IMF, Peregrine Securities 
* Less than 12 months’ maturity  
 
 
5. Other structural deficiencies 
 
Labour market rigidities and the education system 
 
A key ingredient of Korea’s prolonged period of economic growth and development was the 
diligence of its people, who worked long working hours and had high savings rates. They 
were also well educated due to the strong Confucian emphasis on education (OECD (2000). 
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While Koreans have, more recently, continued to work longer hours than their competitors, 
and their savings rates have remained very high, the rapid rise in the wage rate, continued 
labour market rigidities, and the lack of a creative labour force have weakened the 
international competitiveness of Korean firms. With the 1987 Declaration of Democratic 
Reform the government implemented major labour market reforms to strengthen basic 
labour rights, liberalise trade unions 37  and facilitate collective bargaining (Australian 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. (1999)). This resulted in a rapid growth of 
unionism and labour strikes in reaction to the end of the long period of repression. 
Subsequently, nominal wages increased 15 per cent per annum up until 1996, exceeding 
productivity increases of only 11 per cent per annum. Unions remained most militant in the 
chaebol and financial sector where union membership was high. The market dominance of 
the chaebol enabled them to pay higher wages in comparison to that of small and medium 
sized enterprises. Tight labour market conditions and strong trade union power ensured that 
fundamental labour market reform went untouched. The labour market, therefore, remained 
full of rigidities arising from: an excessive degree of job protection that prevented lay-offs 
and encouraged over-manning; inflexibility in working hours; and few limits on strike 
action (Fitch ICBA, 1999).  
 
In December 1996 the Kim Young Sam government passed an amendment to the labour law 
designed to increase labour market flexibility and facilitate retrenchments. Union protests, 
however, compelled the government to pass another amendment in March 1997 diluting the 
proposed reforms. While some measures were introduced in 1997, implementation of most 
was delayed until the end of 1999 and several measures such as legalising temporary work 
agencies38 were dropped. An important opportunity to improve labour market flexibility and 
increase export competitiveness was, consequently, missed. 
 
Since December 1997, the government further amended labour laws to increase labour 
market flexibility, particularly employers’ ability to dismiss workers, but dismissals are still 
closely controlled.  
 
Even more critical than the rapid rise in the wage rate and labour market rigidities has been 
the Korean education system, which no longer provided the economy with the labour force 
it most needed (see Harvie and Lee (2003)). Since the late 1980s, as the Korean economy 
moved toward the income level of a developed country, its products have become more 
sophisticated and its production processes have become more complex and more deeply 
integrated into the world economy. This has meant that Korea has become in urgent need of 
a creative and highly skilled labor force - entrepreneurs, workers, and bankers. However, 
the Korean education system has kept its repetitive-memory-oriented education, which once 
proved to be successful when the Korean economy was at a less developed stage (Lee 
(2001)). 
  
                                                           
37 Labour unions had been allowed since 1953, although the authoritarian governments in the 1960s, 1970s 
and 1980s had severely restricted their right to engage in collective bargaining and to take industrial action. 
The offset to this being that it was very difficult to lay off workers. A situation that remained until the 
reforms of 1998. 
38 Temporary work agencies hire workers and provide them to firms on temporary contracts. 
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Total factor productivity slowdown 
 
In a study published by the Korea Development Institute (Kim and Hong (1997)), the 
evidence presented suggested that the growth of the Korean economy over the period 1963-
95 was based on roughly equal contributions from growth of inputs and improvements in 
factor productivity. Over the shorter period 1985-95 inputs of capital and labour generated 
4.8 percentage points of growth while improvements in total factor productivity ((TFP), due 
primarily to improved resource allocation, economies of scale and advances in knowledge, 
contributed a further 4.1 percentage points. Giving a total growth of GDP of 8.8 percentage 
points. The report also suggested that the contribution from TFP would remain significant, 
since an improved corporate governance framework and better managed banking system 
would eventually enhance gains from better resource allocation and economies of scale. 
This contrasted with a study conducted by the World Bank (1999), which suggested that 
Korea’s growth had been primarily driven by factor accumulation - increased inputs of 
labour and capital - while TFP growth had been relatively less significant. TFP was 
estimated to have contributed only 1.8 percentage points of growth per annum - one fourth 
of total growth (World Bank (1999)). Another study by Kim (1999) presented evidence to 
suggest that the rate of TFP growth appeared to have decelerated during the past two 
decades in most industries. The results from this study are shown in Table 14. As can be 
observed, TFP deteriorated significantly during the period of the 1990s in comparison to 
that of the 1980s for all sectors, with the exception of transport and communications, and 
most disturbingly for the manufacturing sector. This presents a much gloomier position for 
productivity and competitiveness development for the Korean economy, suggesting that 
considerable improvements in resource allocation, economies of scale and advances in 
knowledge by the economy would be urgently required if Korea was to compete effectively 
in global markets. 
 
Kim (1999) also reported that investment efficiency deteriorated in the 1990s relative to 
that of the 1980s. The investment boom of the 1990s, based upon this evidence, had the 
effect of increasing capacity but had a detrimental effect on overall efficiency.    
 
Unfriendly global economic environment 
 
Korea’s fast growth was in part due to international circumstances that were favourable 
until the late 1980s. First, the movement towards free trade under GATT enabled Korea to 
effectively pursue an export-oriented growth strategy. Following a number of multilateral 
trade talks the developed countries moved toward the opening of their domestic markets, 
yet Korea, a less developed country, was allowed to keep its domestic market effectively 
closed until the end of the 1980s. Second, Korea, which became a part of western 
capitalism after its independence in 1945, received a considerable amount of explicit and 
implicit economic assistance from the United States during the cold war era. The United 
States also provided the largest market for Korean exports (Lee (1999a)).  
  
Since the late 1980s, however, Korean companies faced increasingly intense competition 
with foreign companies in both domestic and international markets. Competition has mainly 
come from the rapid opening of the domestic market and the rapid catch-up growth of the 
 25 
new Newly Industrialised Economies (NNIEs) of south-east Asia. In addition, Korea and 
the United States have had repetitive trade conflicts in various areas. Korea’s relatively 
heavy protectionism and state intervention in the market were the traditional reasons 
advanced for this. However, this situation had been in existence for some period of time. A 
more compelling reason is that Korea’s strategic importance, in the forefront of the free 
world, had lessened dramatically since the 1980s, as the former Soviet Union fell apart and 
its former satellite states initiated economic reforms and the movement towards a market 
economy. Even though the United States still stationed its troops in Korea, it became less 
tolerant with Korea’s industrial policy (Lee (1999a)). Accordingly, between 1990 and 1996, 
out of the total trade conflicts Korea had with all other countries, 36 per cent of these were 
recorded with the United States.  
 
Since 1991 Korea has had continuous deficits in its trade with the United States, except for 
1993 where it recorded a US$0.2 billion surplus. This was quite a remarkable sign of the 
weakening of Korea’s competitiveness, because the United States had traditionally been 
Korea’s largest export market and was the country with which Korea had once enjoyed the 
largest trade surpluses. 
Developments in the advanced economies 
While the financial problems in Korea, and other East Asian countries, were mostly home-
grown, developments in the advanced economies and global financial markets also 
contributed significantly to the build up of the imbalances that eventually led to the 
financial crisis of 1997. The World Bank estimated that net inflows of long-term debt, FDI, 
and equity purchases to the Asia Pacific region were only about US$25 billion in 1990, but 
peaked at more than US$110 billion by 1996. A major impetus behind this rapid expansion 
was the global stock market boom of the 1990s. As that boom progressed, investors in 
many industrial countries found themselves more heavily concentrated in higher valued 
securities of companies in the developed world whose rates of return, in many instances, 
had fallen to levels perceived as uncompetitive with the earnings potential in emerging 
economies and especially in Asia. The resulting investor diversification induced a sharp 
increase in capital flows into the rapidly growing economies of East Asia attracted by the 
prospect of higher relative returns, contributing to a property and stock market boom in 
these economies as well as over-investment in productive assets. To a large extent they 
came from investors in the United States, Western Europe, and Japan. The rising value of 
the yen through mid 1995 also encouraged a substantial increase in direct investment 
inflows from Japan. With hindsight it is clear that more investment monies flowed into the 
economies in East Asia, including Korea, than could be profitably employed at moderate 
risk (see Greenspan (1998)). In the context of weak financial systems, moral hazard 
problems, in conjunction with financial liberalisation, these exacerbated imprudent and 
unprofitable investment by the domestic banking system. In the case of Korea intense 
pressure was placed upon the country to liberalise capital flows and financial markets. 
Korea made the fundamental mistake of liberalising short-term capital flows, thereby 
contributing to an excessive build up of short-term debt from foreign banks only too willing 
to lend. Korean policy makers demonstrated a preference for external borrowing over FDI. 
This was primarily due to strong anti foreign sentiment related to Korea’s relatively recent 
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experience of colonialism and the government’s capacity to allocate foreign borrowing to 
priority sectors.  
To improve foreign borrowing terms the government encouraged commercial banks to issue 
bonds overseas and syndicate loans for on-lending to domestic firms. FDI, on the other 
hand, was discouraged by a range of restrictive policies (Australian Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade. (1999)). As a result, by 1997, external debt was significantly larger than 
FDI. The country’s reliance on short-term debt, in particular, exposed Korea to sudden 
negative changes in creditor sentiment, as occurred in late 1997.  
 
Rapid opening of the domestic market 
 
In 1989 Korea announced that it would no longer restrict trade for the sake of its balance of 
payments (as covered in GATT Article XVIIIB) and it would follow article XI, further 
increasing its pace of import liberalisation. With the conclusion of the Uruguay Round and 
the embarkation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), Korea faced a more rapid 
opening of its domestic market. Furthermore, former President Kim Young Sam, who came 
to power in 1993, proclaimed that Korea would join the OECD during his term of office. 
OECD access required that Korea open even wider and faster its domestic market. As a 
result, by 1996 the number of restrictions, and the average tariff rates for manufactured 
goods, were comparable to those of most industrial countries. 
 
Compared to the goods market, the financial market, in the name of financial liberalisation, 
underwent an even faster opening. During the early 1990s, restrictions on the inflow and 
outflow of mobile capital were nearly all removed39. However, the liberalisation happened 
with little attention to the new kinds of regulation that would be required and with only a 
thin base of financial skills. The liberalised financial systems enabled inexperienced private 
domestic banks and corporations to take out large foreign currency denominated loans from 
foreign lenders. Thus, the rapid opening and liberalisation of the financial market in the 
early 1990s left the economy exposed and vulnerable to the instabilities of international 
financial markets.  
 
A Nut in a Nutcracker 
 
Since the early 1980s China strongly pursued a so-called ‘reform and open-door policy’. 
This new policy was very successful, and between 1980 and 1996 China’s real GDP grew 
by more than 10 per cent per annum. The rise of China, however, meant intense new 
competition for Korean firms. China’s manufactured exports grew by more than 20 per cent 
per annum in US dollar terms between 1990 and 1996, and Chinese firms competed directly 
with Korean firms in textiles, apparel, and electronics. In addition, the rapid catch-up 
growth of the NNIEs of south-east Asia, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the 
Philippines also led to harsher competition for Korea.   
 
This new competition put intense competitive pressures on Korea and hence its exports. 
Accordingly, to maintain higher wage rates than the NNIEs, Korea had to change its 
                                                           
39 Park (1996) and Kim (1997) summarise the liberalisation process. 
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industrial structure in order to become more high-tech-oriented. In fact, following the 
textbook example of Japan, Korea invested substantial amounts of capital into the so-called 
strategic industries such as electronics, automobiles, and bio-chemicals. As a consequence, 
however, Korean companies found themselves competing directly against Japanese 
companies in some important industries. Thus, Korea faced a very difficult economic 
predicament. It had to compete against China and other NNIEs on the one hand, and against 
Japan on the other. That is, Korea was being squeezed both from above and from below. In 
short, Korea was situated like ‘a nut in a nutcracker’ as stated first in the Booz Allen & 
Hamilton (1997) report on the Korean economy that was published just before the financial 
crisis. 
  
Korea, a nut in a nutcracker, faced even more competitive pressure when in January 1994 
China devalued the yuan by 50 per cent, and as the Japanese yen progressively depreciated 
against the U.S. dollar: from ¥/US$85 in June 1995 to ¥/US$127 in April 1997. From the 
early 1990s to mid 1995 the strong Japanese yen had masked Korea’s declining 
competitiveness, with exports, output and investment growing strongly. However, the yen’s 
depreciation from mid 1995 sharply reduced corporate profits and new investment. Tight 
cash flow conditions caused by the deterioration in profitability kept interest rates above 
international levels (see Table 10), which, along with the stable nominal exchange rate 
against the US$ in particular, encouraged foreign borrowing. The collapse of semi-
conductor prices by as much as 80 per cent in 1996 further exacerbated Korea’s difficulties. 
This delivered a severe terms-of-trade shock to Korea, for this industry accounted for 20 per 
cent of Korean total exports by value.  
 
 
6.  Policy mistakes  
 
Among the policy mistakes made by the Korean government during the period of the 1990s 
three are worthy of focus. The prime mistake related to its exchange rate policy. 
Inappropriate and inadequate financial market supervision also turned out to be a serious 
mistake. The Korean government also failed to take appropriate action in response to the 
repeated defaults of chaebols and speculative attacks on the currency in early 1997.  
 
Strong Won policy 
Since the late 1980s the international competitiveness of Korean industry continued to falter 
as economic fundamentals and international circumstances deteriorated. Instead of allowing 
the won to depreciate, and thereby alleviate the country’s current account deficits, the 
government adopted a strong won policy. The strong won policy was maintained through 
the so-called market average foreign exchange rate system, which was adopted in 1990. The 
exchange rate was allowed to move within a daily fluctuation band, which was kept narrow 
(see Figure 2). Radelet and Sachs (1998b) estimated that the Korean won appreciated in real 
terms by about 12 per cent between 1990 and 1997. 
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Figure 2 
 
 
Why did the Korean government insist on a strong won policy? The following are some 
possible explanations. First, to achieve the target of a single-digit inflation rate per annum, 
the Korean government insisted on nominal exchange rate stability. That is, inflation 
control was the overriding priority of macroeconomic policy and the exchange rate was an 
‘anchor’ for inflation control. Second, the Korean government maintained the position that 
a strong won would push Korean firms to strive to increase their productivity and hence 
international competitiveness. Third, the government wanted to keep the exchange rate 
stable in order to help domestic corporations and financial institutions by lowering the 
domestic currency costs of servicing foreign debts denominated in foreign currency. Fourth, 
a political consideration also made the exchange rate policy less flexible. The then Kim 
Young Sam government strongly wanted to see the country achieve a US$10,000 income 
per capita. Once this was achieved in 1995, the government did not want it to slide arising 
from a depreciation of the domestic currency. 
 
Inappropriate and inadequate supervision of the financial sector 
 
As noted previously the financial market underwent very rapid liberalisation and 
deregulation during the early 1990s40. This allowed domestic financial institutions to have 
easy access to foreign capital to finance domestic investment. There were two major 
deficiencies with the process. First, financial liberalisation was carried out mostly on short-
                                                           
40 However this liberalisation was imbalanced, in terms of internal relative to external liberalisation. There 
was rapid external liberalisation but regulation of the domestic financial sector remained. 
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term rather than long-term capital inflows. For instance, net foreign portfolio investment, 
which was merely US$0.1 billion in 1990, increased drastically to US$3.1 billion in 1991, 
US$5.8 billion in 1992, and US$10.0 billion in 1993. This upward trend continued until 
1997. However, net direct investment continuously produced negative values, indicating 
that foreigners’ direct investment in Korea was smaller than Korea’s direct investment 
overseas (see Figure 3)41. 
 
Second, appropriate supervision and prudential regulation did not accompany financial 
liberalisation. The NBFIs such as merchant banks, especially, which increased sharply in 
number from six in 1993 to thirty by 1996, were not under appropriate supervision. With 
the belief that the government would not allow financial institutions to fail Korean banks 
borrowed unhedged short-run foreign capital at lower rates, denominated in US dollars, and 
made long-term loans at higher rates, with the expectation that they could continually renew 
short-term borrowing. This led to a serious mismatch in maturities between borrowing and 
lending. Short-term loans accounted for 63 per cent of total debts on the eve of the financial 
crisis. With this fragile structure of foreign debt, Korea became very vulnerable to 
instabilities in international financial markets. 
 
Naive policy response to the early warning signs 
 
A series of policy mistakes were also made in response to the early symptoms or warning 
signs of the impending crisis, which started to appear in early 1997. First, the Korean 
government did not properly and swiftly deal with the corporate insolvencies, which had a 
devastating impact on Korea’s financial system. The government repeatedly declared that 
troubled firms would be dealt with on the basis of the market mechanism. However, amid 
the critical situation in the first half of 1997 the government aggravated the financial 
turmoil by taking measures counter to market principles such as the Bankruptcy Prevention 
Accord and state subsidies for the hopelessly ailing chaebols. In particular, the Korean 
government’s decision to convert Kia Motors, the insolvent eighth largest chaebol (see 
Table 12), into a public enterprise heightened the confusion and distrust among foreign 
investors. 
 
The second mistake made by the government was with the exchange rate policy. With the 
Thai currency collapse in July 1997, contagion spread to Indonesia, Malaysia, and even to  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Singapore and Hong Kong. When speculative attacks on the Korean won began in October 
and accelerated in November, the Korean government maintained a narrow daily fluctuation 
band and tried to defend the Korean won inexplicably wasting valuable foreign exchange 
reserves. As a consequence, Korea’s available foreign exchange reserves fell far below the 
                                                           
41 This had been the case since 1989. 
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outstanding short-term foreign debts. In retrospect, if the band had been widened earlier, 
and the exchange rate had been allowed to float freely, the Korean won would have 
depreciated gradually and this would have helped limit the extent of the crisis. 
 
Third, the Korean government waited until the country’s useable foreign currency reserves 
plummeted to US$7.3 billion, and the country was on the verge of a debt moratorium, 
before turning to the IMF on 21 November 1997. As Korean banks faced difficulties in 
rolling over their short-term foreign liabilities, the Bank of Korea shifted foreign exchange 
reserves to the banks’ offshore branches and announced a guarantee of foreign borrowing 
by Korean banks. However, this action merely helped many foreign creditors to escape from 
Korea, and Korea soon found itself on the brink of national insolvency as the country’s 
useable reserves became almost depleted.  
 
Thus, once the financial crisis began to spread from Thailand, the Korean government made 
a number of mistakes, and these mistakes accelerated the capital withdrawals and caused a 
serous crisis of its own. 
 
Why then did the Korean government, once considered shrewd and efficient, make such 
policy mistakes? Most of all, the then Korean government was in total disarray in its 
decision-making during the lame duck period of Kim Young Sam’s presidency. The 
presidential election was scheduled to take place in December 1997. For instance, when the 
crisis was escalating, there was an internal struggle between the Ministry of Finance and 
Economy (MoFE) and the central bank over their roles in the financial market.  
 
 
7. Policy lessons from Korea’s experience in the 1990s 
 
By the end of the 1980s and early 1990s it was apparent that Korea’s interventionist and 
export oriented development model had produced serious structural weaknesses and policy 
errors (see Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. (1999), and Harvie and Lee 
(2003a)). These structural weaknesses were heavy exposure to short term foreign 
borrowing, excessive chaebol borrowing and investment, facilitated by a weak financial 
sector, concentrated corporate sector with poor corporate disclosure and governance, and 
weak prudential controls. Poor official management of foreign debt exposure, foreign 
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exchange reserves and the exchange rate, and political uncertainty in the lead up to the 
Presidential election in December 1997 further exacerbated structural weaknesses. These 
structural weaknesses made Korea vulnerable to the external shocks which occurred after 
1995, including the yen depreciation, falling semi-conductor prices, and the financial 
contagion from the south-east Asia, culminating in the financial and economic crisis of late 
1997 and 1998.  
 
There are a number of important lessons to be derived for other developing countries from 
Korea’s experience. 
 
First, financial liberalisation requires the implementation of adequate prudential controls. 
For Korea, in the early and mid 1990s, the authorities eliminated and relaxed many 
restrictions on interest rates, financial institutions’ portfolio holdings and foreign borrowing 
to enable market oriented monetary policy implementation and to open the capital account 
prior to OECD membership in 1996. As a consequence the supervisory authorities reduced 
their ability to directly control the operation of the financial sector, but did not set up 
alternative prudential regulation systems to safeguard the stability and soundness of 
financial institutions. As a result the supervisory agencies failed to adequately monitor or 
regulate the international activities of domestic financial institutions.  
 
Second, there is a need to monitor short-term foreign borrowing. In the case of Korea the 
absence of adequate prudential controls, progressive but piecemeal financial market and 
capital control deregulation from 1994-97, high domestic interest rates and stability of the 
won/US$ exchange rate led to a surge in foreign capital borrowing and rising foreign debt. 
Relaxation of capital controls on short-term borrowing but not on long-term borrowing 
contributed to this. A stable exchange rate policy and high domestic interest rates 
encouraged foreign borrowing by banks and corporations. Lifting the ceiling on short term 
foreign currency borrowing by commercial banks but imposing a ban on medium and long 
term borrowing encouraged banks and corporations to raise short term loans overseas to 
finance long term domestic lending and asset acquisition. A maturity mismatch therefore 
ensued. 
 
Third, there is a need to ensure that corporations are on a sound financial footing and do not 
engage in excessive borrowing and investment. There is also a need to ensure their good 
corporate governance, transparency, the elimination of moral hazard, collusive and corrupt 
behaviour and a too big to fail mentality. While at the core of Korea’s economic 
development model from the mid 1960s, and particularly the 1970s, their domestic market 
dominance, easy access to credit, high debt and cross guarantees, over-investment and low 
profitability by the 1990s led to structural weaknesses and a fundamentally weak and 
uncompetitive corporate sector.  Weaknesses in the corporate sector were also reflected in 
weaknesses in the banking sector. These sectors being inextricably linked. The string of 
chaebol bankruptcies in 1997 severely weakened the balance sheets of financial institutions 
with exposure to failing corporations. Many of them found themselves with a high 
proportion of non-performing loans. 
 
Fourth, macroeconomic policy settings, if misguided or mismanaged, exert an important 
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influence on economic outcomes, and can contribute to significant economic and financial 
instability. This was most apparent in the case of exchange rate and foreign reserve 
management in Korea. Between 1981 and 1995 Korea’s exchange rate management resulted 
in its nominal won/US$ exchange rate remaining relatively stable and within +/- 10 per cent 
of its average during this period. While nominal US dollar exchange rate stability benefitted 
exporters and domestic investors using foreign borrowings, it also encouraged banks and 
companies to borrow unhedged in foreign currencies. This proved to be highly problematic 
in the lead up to the financial crisis. Another problem with maintaining nominal exchange 
rate stability with the US dollar was that the real trade weighted exchange rate fluctuated 
more than the nominal exchange rate.  
 
The Bank of Korea’s unsuccessful and expensive intervention to defend the won in the 
months leading up to the crisis eroded investor confidence. The Bank of Korea in reality, 
however, had little choice because of the legislative requirement to maintain daily won 
fluctuations to a band of +/- 2.25 per cent around the market rate of the previous day. 
During 1997 the Bank of Korea spent about US$23 billion in foreign exchange reserves 
defending the won. Foreign exchange reserves, normally maintained at over US$30 billion, 
approximately 2.5 months of imports, declined rapidly throughout 1997. Useable reserves 
fell to below US$8 billion by late November 1997, which was only 8 per cent of the level of 
outstanding short-term debt or just two weeks of imports.  
 
Fifth, the maintenance of political stability and international confidence in the domestic 
economy is crucial. In Korea’s case the timing of its crisis was unfortunate for domestic 
political reasons. An ineffective and vasilating government with Presidential elections due 
in December 1997 contributed to a loss of market confidence in the ability of the incumbent 
government to contain the financial crisis, and to take the necessary measures to quell 
investor fears and to effectively manage the economy. With economic policy drifting, 
foreign exchange reserves falling precipitously and non-performing loans at the financial 
institutions rising due to corporate faults, international investors and banks began to limit 
their exposure to Korea and withdrew their capital or refused to roll-over short term loans.   
 
 
8. Summary and conclusions 
 
The seeds of the financial crisis that hit Korea in late 1997 were planted during the period 
of the 1990s and earlier. The benign macroeconomic environment of the 1990s 
characterised by: high GDP and export growth until 1996; low inflation; fiscal surpluses in 
general; high savings and investment; low unemployment; and, until 1996, modest trade 
and current account balances, hid growing financial weaknesses in both the corporate and 
financial sectors and an unprecedented accumulation of short term debt. The latter 
development increasingly exposed the country to financial turbulence in global and regional 
markets. However, these fragilities were of little concern in an environment of rapid growth 
of exports and output. With the deterioration of the country’s terms of trade and resulting 
growth slowdown in export values in 1996 and 1997, however, the highly over-leveraged 
corporate sector came under intense profitability and cash flow pressures. In 1997 a number 
of chaebol became insolvent or had to seek protection from creditors. An already shaky 
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financial sector, arising from imprudent and excessive lending to the chaebol, experienced a 
further sharp deterioration in their non-performing loans. Government action to tackle this 
problem head on was lacking. By October 1997 further pressure began to be strongly 
applied by international investors on the currency as concerns over the third major fragility, 
excessive short term foreign debt, came in to play. The ability of the country to meet its 
short-term interest and debt repayments was questioned as useable foreign exchange 
reserves diminished alarmingly. The consequence was the financial and economic crisis of 
1997-98. 
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Table 1 Macroeconomic Indicators for Korea 1990-1997 
  
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
 
Nominal GDP 
(US$ Billion) 252.5 295.1 314.7 345.7 402.4 489.4 520.0 476.6 
Per Capita GDP 
(US$) 5,890 6,816 7,193 7,822 9,014 10,853 11,417 10,363 
GDP Real Growth 
Rate (%) 9.0 9.2 5.4 5.5 8.3 8.9 6.8 5.0 
 
Real Growth in Demand 
Components (%): 
Private consumption 10.7 9.5 6.6 5.7 7.6 8.3 6.8 3.1 
Government cons. 7.2 8.5 7.6 3.0 4.2 1.0 7.8 5.7 
Gross fixed capital 
formation 25.9 12.6 -0.8 5.2 11.8 11.7 7.1 -3.5 
Total domestic demand 13.1 11.3 3.4 4.3 10.2 8.3 8.2 -2.8 
Exports of goods and 
services 4.2 11.8 11.0 11.3 16.5 24.0 13.0 23.6 
Imports of goods and 
services 14.3 19.2 5.1 6.7 21.7 22.0 14.8 3.8 
 
Industrial production 9.0 9.5 5.9 4.3 10.9 11.9 7.7 6.8 
(% growth) 
Real Growth in 
Sectoral Output (%): 
Manufacturing 9.2 9.5 5.3 5.4 10.8 11.3 6.8 6.6 
Construction 25.5 15.1 -0.4 8.3 4.6 8.8 6.9 1.4 
Agriculture, forestry  -5.9 2.9 9.6 -4.5 0.2 6.6 3.3 4.6 
and fishing 
Services 9.3 10.3 7.0 7.2 10.3 9.6 7.8 5.4 
 
Unemployment (%) 2.4 2.3 2.4 2.8 2.4 2.0 2.0 2.6 
Productivity  
(GDP/employment) 6.3 6.0 3.1 4.1 5.4 6.0 5.1 4.1 
Unit labour costs 
(compensation/GDP) 12.3 13.6 6.9 4.0 4.2 6.6 5.9 1.9 
 
Investment rate   
  (% of GNDI) 37.6 39.8 37.3 35.4 36.5 37.3 38.1 34.4 
Saving rate (% of GNDI) 37.5 37.3 36.4 36.2 35.5 35.5 33.8 33.4 
 
CPI (%) 8.5 9.3 6.3 4.8 6.2 4.5 4.9 4.5 
Government fiscal  
Balance (% of GDP) -0.7 -1.6 -0.5 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.3  
 
Interest Rate (%) 
Corporate Bond Yields 16.5 18.9 16.2 12.6 12.9 13.7 11.8 13.4 
Stock market price index 696 611 678 866 1027 883 651 376 
 
  
Sources: Bank of Korea; Korea Development Institute 
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Table 2 Korea’s Trade, Balance of Payments and Exchange Rate (US$ Billion) 
1990-1997 
 
  
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
 
 
Merchandise Exports (Fob) 63.7 70.5 76.2 82.1 95.0 124.6 130.0 138.6 
 
Merchandise Imports (Fob) 66.1 77.3 78.0 79.8 97.8 129.1 144.9 141.8 
 
Trade Balance -2.5 -6.8 -1.8 2.3 -2.9 -4.4 -15.0 -3.2 
 
Invisibles Balance 0.5 -1.5 -2.2 -1.3 -1.0 -4.1      -8.1  -5.0 
 
Current Account Balance  -2.0 -8.3 -3.9 1.0 -3.9 -8.5 -23.0 -8.2 
(% of GDP) -0.8 -2.8 -1.3 0.3 -1.0 -1.9 -4.7 -1.8 
 
Exports  65.0 71.9 76.6 82.2 96.0 125.1 129.7 136.2 
(% change on previous year) 4.2 10.5 6.6 7.3 16.8 30.3 3.7 5.0 
 
Imports (Cif) 69.8 81.5 81.8 83.8 102.3 135.1 150.3 144.6 
(% change on previous year) 13.5 16.8 0.4 2.4 22.1 32.1 11.3 -3.8 
 
Gross External Debt 31.9 39.3 42.6 43.9 56.9 78.4 104.7 120.8 
Net External Debt 4.9 12.5 11.0 7.9 10.3 17.1 34.7 55.7 
Foreign Exchange Reserves 14.5 13.3 16.6 19.7 25.0 31.9 33.2 19.7  
 
Gold and Foreign Exchange  14.8 13.7 17.2 20.3 25.7 32.7 33.2 20.4 
Reserves  
 
Total debt (% of GDP) 12.6  13.3 13.5 12.7 14.1 16.0 20.1 25.3
  
Short term debt (% of total debt) 30.9 28.2 27.1 25.8 43.6 54.2 57.5 39.3 
Short term debt/foreign exchange  74.5 84.2 71.7 61.9 126.4 146.1 200.6 273.1 
reserves (%) 
 
Exchange rate: (Won/US$) 716.4 760.8 788.4 808.1 788.7 774.7 884.2 1695.0 
(year end) 
Real exchange rate (1990=100) 100 99 94 93 91 88 88 157 
(year end) 
 
 
External liabilities calculated to IBRD standards. 
Sources: IMF; Bank of Korea; Korea Development Institute. 
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Table 3 Korea’s exports and imports by Commodity Group 1990-1997 
 
  
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
    
 
 
Major exports (% of total exports)  
Machinery and transport equipment 37.7 36.6 41.6 44.9 49.0 52.5 52.1 50.0 
Manufactured goods 52.4 46.0 46.5 42.5 38.0 32.7 30.2 30.2 
Chemicals 3.3 3.7 4.4 6.0 6.6 7.1 7.0 7.8 
Mineral fuels 1.1 1.1 2.1 2.3 1.8 1.9 3.0 3.9 
 
Major imports (% of total imports) 
Machinery and transport equipment 32.7 32.8 33.3 33.9 36.5 36.6 36.3 33.7 
Manufactured goods 21.5 20.7 22.6 21.7 23.5 23.7 21.9 21.3 
Mineral fuels 12.4 15.9 15.6 18.0 15.1 14.1 16.1 18.9 
Raw materials 14.2 12.2 10.9 10.6 9.2 8.7 8.1 7.5 
Chemicals 11.6 10.3 10.0 9.8 9.5 9.7 8.8 9.1 
 
 
Sources: Korea Customs Service, Korea International Trade Association 
  
Table 4 International tariff barriers, 1988 and 1996 
 
 
Average tariffs (%)    
Country 1988 1996     
 
 
Australia 15.6 5.0  
Canada 3.7 1.6 
Chile 19.9 11.0 
China 39.5 23.0 
European Union 5.7 3.6 
Hong Kong 0 0 
Indonesia 18.1 13.1 
Japan 4.3 4.0 
Korea 19.2 7.9 
Malaysia 13.6 9.0 
Mexico 10.5 9.8 
New Zealand 14.9 5.7 
Philippines 27.9 15.6 
Singapore 0.3 0 
Taiwan 12.6 8.6 
Thailand 31.2 17.0 
USA 4.2 3.4 
 
 
Sources: Manila Action Plan for APEC, European Union. 
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Table 5 Major trading partners (various) 1990-1997 (% of total trade) 
 
  
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
    
 
 
USA 29.5 26.9 24.4 21.7 21.2 21.0 19.6 18.4
   
Japan 22.6 23.1 21.8 19.0 19.6 19.1 16.8 15.2 
EU 12.8 12.8 11.3 11.8 12.0 13.2 13.0 12.7 
China 1.7 2.1 2.9 4.0 5.9 6.4 7.1 8.9 
Hong Kong 3.2 3.3 3.6 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.3 4.5 
Australia 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.5 2.5 2.9 2.9 
Saudi Arabia 1.5 1.8 2.8 2.8 2.4 2.5 2.8 2.9
 
 
Sources: National Statistical Office 
  
Table 6 Direction of exports 1995-98 (in per cent of total) 
 
  
  1995 1996 1997 1998   
 
 
Industrial countries 48.6 42.7 44.1 48.1 
Of which: 
Australia 1.3 1.4 1.6 2.1 
Canada 1.4 0.9 1.1 1.2 
EU 12.2 10.8 12.4 13.8 
Japan 13.6 12.3 10.9 9.3 
USA 19.3 16.7 16.1 17.4 
 
Developing countries 46.4 50.9 55.7 51.8 
Africa 1.2 1.1 2.4 2.4 
Asia: 5.1 37.8 39.1 34.0 
 Of which China 7.3 8.8 10.0 9.0 
Europe 2.2 3.1 4.6 4.2 
Middle East  3.1 3.4 3.6 4.7 
Western Hemisphere 4.7 5.5 6.1 6.5 
 
Other countries 5.0 6.4 0.1 0.1 
 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
  
 
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, Bank of Korea 
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Table 7 Imports by country of origin 1995-98 (in per cent of total) 
 
  
  1995 1996 1997 1998   
 
 
Industrial countries 67.4 65.3 61.4 61.3 
Of which: 
EU 13.4 14.1 13.1 11.7 
Japan 24.1 20.9 19.3 18.1 
USA 22.5 22.1 20.8 21.9 
 
Developing countries 29.4 31.4 38.5 38.7 
Africa 1.5 1.3 1.7 1.8 
Asia 16.0 16.7 19.0 20.2 
Europe 1.5 1.3 1.7 1.8 
Middle East  8.6 9.7 11.8 12.1 
Western Hemisphere 2.4 2.5 2.8 2.3 
 
Other countries 3.2 3.3 0.0 0.0 
 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
  
 
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, Bank of Korea 
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Table 8 Foreign direct investment in Korea 1993-1998 (US$ million) 
 
  
  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997  1998 
 
 
By source country: 
  
USA 341 311 645 876 3,189 2,975 
Japan 286 428 418 255 266 504 
Europe 307 407 475 1,058 2,409 2,968 
Other 110 170 403 1,014 1,107 2,405 
Total 1,044 1,316 1,941 3,203 6,971 8,852 
 
By industry: 
 
Chemicals  107 174 389 235 755 
Foodstuffs  18 15 253 851 719 
Pharmaceuticals  38 65 32 44 134 
Metal  7 7 13 14 7 
Machinery  49 102 159 166 587 
Electronics  63 228 436 291 1,377 
Financial services  294 378 250 265 506 
Hotels and tourism  293 216 228 2,596 303 
Construction  7 11 32 64 5 
Other  440 745 1,411 2,445 4,459 
Total  1,316 1,941 3,203 6,971 8,852 
 
 
Sources: Ministry of Finance and Economy. 
  
Table 9 Korea’s outward foreign investment 1990-1997 (US$ million) 
 
  
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997    
 
 
Asia (exc. China) 275 384 380 237 518 884 869 943 
China  16 42 141 264 632 824  836 633 
Middle East 40 59 75 86 38 32  26  69 
North America 438 459 391 390 567 545 1552 736 
Latin America 67 42 37 44 49 120 256 258 
Europe 64 89 143 175 357 585 590 349 
Africa 27 18 29 31 114 42  12 109 
Oceania 32 23 24 35 25 39  72 129 
Total 959 1115 1219 1262 2300 3070          4214     3227 
 
 
Source: The Export-Import Bank of Korea. 
 
 
 
Table 10 International comparison of factor costs (per cent) 
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  USA  Japan  Taiwan   Korea    
 
 
Annual nominal wage growth 3.0  1.2  5.4  16.2 
(manufacturing 1987-94) 
 
Land prices 
(factory, US$/m2, 1995)  5 – 10  195.6  48.4  226.8 
 
Borrowing rate of interest (1995) 8.5    4.3  6.2  11.7 
 
 
Source: Federation of Korean Industries, 1996. 
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Table 11  Performance of the top 30 Chaebols 1996, and debt-equity ratios1 
    
Rank2 Company3 Total assets3 Total sales3 Net profit3 Profit/assets3 Debt/equity Debt/equity Debt/equity
% ratio 19963 ratio 1997 ratio 19984
% % %
1 Hyundai 531.8 680.1 1.8 0.3 439.1 578.7 508.1
2 Samsung 508.6 601.1 1.8 0.4 268.2 370.9 321.4
3 LG 370.7 466.7 3.6 1 346.5 505.8 481.7
4 Daewoo 342.1 382.5 3.6 1.1 337.3 472 406.9
5 Sunkyong 227.3 266.1 2.9 1.3 385 468 378.6
6 Ssangyong 158.1 194.5 -1 -0.6 409 399.7 395.5
7 Kia 141.6 121 -1.3 -0.9 523.6 na na
8 Hanjin 139 87 -1.9 -1.4 556.9 907.8 632.5
9 Hanwha 109.7 96.9 -1.8 -1.6 778.2 1214.7 1108
10 Lotte 77.5 71.9 0.5 0.6 191.2 216.5 203.5
11 Kumho 74 44.4 -0.2 -0.3 477.9 944.1 1120.9
12 Halla5 66.3 52.9 0.2 0.3 2067.6 na
13 Doosan 64 40.5 -1.1 -1.7 692.3 590.3 610.9
14 Dongah 62.9 38.9 0.4 0.6 355 359.9 502.3
15 Daelim 57.9 48.3 0.1 0.2 380.1 513.6 472.2
16 Hansol 47.9 25.5 -0.1 -0.2 343.2 399.9 532.7
17 Hyosung 41.2 54.8 0.4 1 373.2 465.1 463.5
18 Jinro5 39.4 14.8 -1.6 -4.1 8598.7 na
19 Kolon 38 41.3 0.2 0.5 316.5 433.5 412.7
20 Dongguk 37 30.7 0.9 2.4 210.4 323.8 261.9
Jaekank
21 Kohap6 36.5 25.2 0.3 0.8 589.5 472.1
22 Haitai6 34 27.2 0.4 1.2 658.3 1501.3
23 New Core 28 18.3 0.2 0.7 1224 1784.1 na
24 Anam 26.4 19.8 0.1 0.4 478.1 1498.5 1713.7
Industrial
25 Hanil 26.3 13 -1.2 -4.6 563.2 na na
26 Sammi 25.2 14.9 -2.5 -9.9 3245 na na
27 Sinho6 21.3 12.2 -0.1 -0.5 489.5 676.8
Jaeji
28 Bongil 20.3 8.7 -0.9 -4.4 920.5 na na
29 Dongguk 16.2 10.7 -0.2 -1.2 587.9 na na
Muyok
30 Hansin 13.3 10.6 0 0 648.8 na na
Kongyong
Total7 386.5 519 458.2
Note: na means that the group no longer qualifies for the list of top 30 groups.  
1. debt to equity ratio of non financial companies only
2. ranking is based on total assets
3. as at the end of December 1996
4. as of the end of June.
5. negative equity in 1997 and did not qualify for the list in 1998
6. negative equity in 1998
7. total figure taken from Nam et al. (1999)
Source: Nam et al. (1999)
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Table 12 Major bankruptcies and near bankruptcies in 1997 
  
  
Date Company Major  Rank Estimated loans Estimated loans 
 businesses among loans by banks by non-banks 
  chaebol* Won billion) (Won billion) 
 
23 January Hanbo Steel 14 3,345 2,130 
19 March Sammi Steel 26    371    452 
21 April Jinro Alcoholic liquor and 19    868 2,342 
  retail 
19 May Daenong Retail and textiles 34    483    668 
17 July Kia Automobiles  8 2,805 5,011 
1 November Haitai Food and electronics 24 1,488 1,880 
4 November New Core Retail 25    905    293 
8 December Halla Heavy industry 12 3,036 3,440 
 
Total debt     13,301 16,216         
 
Note: * The national ranking figures indicate size in terms of assets. 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economy, 1998. 
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Table 13 Profitability of the banking system 1990-1998  
 
  Average 
  1990-93 1994 1995 1996 1997  1998 
 
 
Return on assets (%) 
Nation wide banks 0.51 0.40 0.28 0.23 -0.90 -2.99 
Regional banks 0.84 0.53 0.56 0.47 -1.17 -5.83 
All banks 0.56 0.42 0.32 0.26 -0.93 -3.15 
  
Return on equity (%) 
Five major banks 6.10 6.00 3.40 1.20 -31.6 na 
Nation wide banks 6.30 6.17 3.91 3.49 -14.09 -48.63 
Regional banks 6.70 5.73 5.63 5.41 -14.77 -84.40 
All banks 6.40 6.09 4.19 3.80 -14.18 -52.53 
 
Net interest margin (basis points) 
 
Five major banks 2.37 1.87 2.70 na na na 
Nation wide banks 2.31 1.21 2.40 2.98 2.03 0.94 
Regional banks 4.37 4.30 3.76 3.99 2.32 0.95 
All banks 2.72 1.74 2.68 3.18 2.07 0.94 
 
Non performing loans at  
commercial banks 
in billion won 9394 11390 12484 11874 22652 22225 
As percent of total loans 7.3 5.8 5.2 4.1 6.0 7.4 
 
Capital adequacy ratios of banks 
(%) 
Five major banks 8.87 10.46 9.21 8.86 4.46 na 
Nation wide banks 9.39 10.19 8.97 8.97 6.66 8.22 
Regional banks 13.95 13.11 11.44 10.15 9.80 8.31 
All banks 10.00 10.62 9.33 9.14 7.04 8.23 
 
Employees (1990 = 100) 
Total 104.8 106.1 125.6 126.4 138.7 92.40 
 
 
 
Sources: Financial Supervisory Service. 
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Table 14 Total factor productivity growth 1980-96 
 
  
  1980-84 1985-89 1980-89 1990-96 1980-96    
 
 
A. Average annual change in 
total factor productivity  
Total industry 2.84 2.94 2.90 1.34 2.22 
Agriculture, forestry and 
fishing -6.18 10.13 2.88 9.74 5.88 
Mining and quarrying 6.63 2.31 4.23 3.99 4.13 
Manufacturing 8.98 9.61 9.33 1.26 5.80 
Electricity, gas and water 7.19 3.65 5.22 0.61 3.20 
Construction 0.10 1.52 0.89 -0.31 0.37 
Transportation and  
communications -0.17 3.80 2.04 4.85 3.27 
Transportation and  
communications -2.16 3.21 0.82 -2.74 -0.74 
 
B. Investment efficiency* 
Total industry 0.35 0.48 0.41 0.29 0.36 
Agriculture, forestry and 
fishing 0.76 0.40 0.58 0.12 0.39 
Mining and quarrying -0.22 0.14 -0.04 -1.41 -0.27 
Manufacturing 0.73 0.53 0.63 0.36 0.52 
Electricity, gas and water 0.17 0.85 0.47 0.30 0.40 
Construction 2.74 2.80 2.77 2.50 2.66 
Transportation and  
communications 0.72 1.14 0.93 0.92 0.93 
Transportation and  
communications 0.22 0.53 0.38 0.48 0.42 
  
 
* Change in output divided by change in capital stock 
 
Source: Won-Kyu Kim (1999). 
  
 
 
 
